Values in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights : A Legal-Philosophical Analysis with a Focus on Migrants&#8217; Rights by A. Facchi et al.

Values in the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights
A Legal-Philosophical Analysis 
with a Focus on Migrants’ Rights

Values in the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights
A Legal-Philosophical Analysis 
with a Focus on Migrants’ Rights
G. Giappichelli Editore
Alessandra Facchi - Paola Parolari - Nicola Riva 
 © Copyright 2019 - G. GIAPPICHELLI EDITORE - TORINO
VIA PO, 21 - TEL. 011-81.53.111 - FAX 011-81.25.100
http://www.giappichelli.it
ISBN/EAN 978-88-921-8238-7
This book is a product of the NoVaMigra research project, that has received funding from 
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant 
agreement No. 770330
Opera distribuita con Licenza Creative Commons







1. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. An Intro-
duction 13 
2. The Philosophical Background of the Charter 24 
3. Dignity 35 
4. Freedoms 47 
5. Equality 67 
6. Solidarity 79 






CCFSRW Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights 
of Workers 
CEAS Common European Asylum System 
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
COE Council of Europe 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECR European Commission of Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
ESC European Social Charter 
EU European Union 
FRA Fundamental Rights Agency (of the EU) 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 




This work is intended to make public the main findings 
of the Report on the Normative Content, Genesis, Historical 
Background and Implementation of the EU Charter, elabo-
rated within the research project NoVaMigra – Norms and 
Values in the European Migration and Refugee Crisis, fund-
ed by the European Union under the programme Horizon 
2020 (Grant Agreement no. 770330).  
The NoVaMigra project, coordinated by the University 
of Duisburg-Essen, involves universities and research cen-
tres based in eight European countries, and a university 
based in the United States. It aims at: a) providing a com-
prehensive understanding of the core European values/norms; 
b) explaining how these values/norms motivate and/or affect 
relevant political, administrative, and societal agents with 
regard to migration and the integration of migrants and ref-
ugees into European societies; c) studying whether, how, 
and why these values/norms have been changing as a con-
sequence of the refugee crisis since 2015; and d) developing 
a rights-based democratic perspective for the EU and its 
Member States, which takes into account differences in Eu-
ropean values/norms that became visible during the refugee 
crisis, but also reflects Europe’s global responsibility. In 
pursuing these goals, the NoVaMigra project devotes par-
ticular attention to gender issues. 
Within this research framework, this work provides a 
sketch of a legal-philosophical understanding of the nor-
8 
mative content of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. In particular, it reconstructs how «the in-
divisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, 
equality and solidarity» – on which, according to the pre-
amble of the Charter (par. 2), the «[European] Union is 
founded» – are conceived in the Charter itself. This task is 
mainly carried out through the analysis of the rights specif-
ically associated with each of those values, respectively, in 
Titles 1-4. Nevertheless, punctual references are made also 
to some of the rights included in Titles V and VI, devoted, 
respectively, to citizens’ rights and justice.  
Given its specific contextualization within the NoVaMi-
gra research framework, this work mainly focuses on those 
rights which are, or could be, particularly significant in rela-
tion to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. Furthermore, 
special attention is devoted to women’s rights and gender 
equality. 
The analysis is primarily based on the provisions of the 
Charter, on the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights, and on the case law of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union and the European Court of Human 
Rights1. Nonetheless, EU secondary law and other interna-




1 Our main (although not exclusive) sources in the selection of the 
cited case law are the commentaries to the Charter edited by Peers et al. 
(2014) and Mastroianni et al. (2017), and the reports edited by the Euro-
pean Observer on fundamental right’s respect of the Fondazione Basso 
(2015, 2016 and 2017). 
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As regards its conceptual framework, the analysis com-
bines both a value(s)-based and a rights-based approach, as 
defined in the Conceptual Map elaborated in the very first 
phase of the NoVaMigra project 2. In fact, as is typical of 
legal documents – and, in particular, of such legal docu-
ments as charters of rights and constitutions – the Charter 
uses normative concepts such as “values” and “rights” in 
ways that may appear, from a philosophical perspective, 
vague and ambiguous. It does not develop a coherent moral 
or political theory of how those normative concepts should 
be precisely understood and of how they relate to each oth-
er. In particular, while the Charter explicitly refers to values 
(par. 2-4 of the preamble 3) and organizes fundamental rights 
according to their relations to them, it would be wrong to 
think that it definitely adopts a value(s)-based approach ra-
ther than a rights-based one. On the contrary, it leaves some 
space for both interpretations. Thus, for instance, it is possi-
 
 
2 The Conceptual Map, edited by Jos Philips and Marcus Düwell of 
the Utrecht University research unit, defines the basic normative con-
cepts of “value”, “norm”, “right”, “duty” etc., and identifies two differ-
ent approaches to understand the relations and tensions between them: a 
value(s)-based and a rights-based approach. According to the first one, 
value(s) provide(s) the basis for duties, norms and rights: one value or a 
set of values is identified as what should be promoted, pursued and/or 
realized, and the moral validity of norms, rights and duties depends on 
their contribution to the promotion, pursuit and/or realization of that 
value or set of values. In turn, according to the second approach, duties 
are defined as correlative to rights: valid norms are those that secure 
rights and the language of values can be reduced to the language of 
rights. 
3 See also articles 2 and 6 of the Treaty on the European Union. 
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ble both to consider freedom as a value that precedes and 
grounds specific freedoms (such as, for instance, freedom of 
religion, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
so forth) and to consider references to the value of freedom 
as simply a way of referring to the set of those fundamental 
rights. 
Finally, it is worth specifying that, while this work adopts 
a predominantly philosophical-legal approach, it is aimed at a 
multidisciplinary audience. Accordingly, it avoids an exces-
sively technical language and does not undertake an in-
depth analysis of many philosophically and legally contro-
versial questions, which, while certainly relevant, are also 
very specific and complex. 
The work is structured as follows. The first introductory 
chapter briefly considers the genesis of the Charter and its 
main features, including its field of application and personal 
scope. The second chapter provides a short reconstruction of 
four traditions in the history of European thought – Christi-
anity, Republicanism, Liberalism and Socialism – as those 
traditions which most contributed to the philosophical back-
ground of the values affirmed in the Charter. Chapters 3-6 
analyse synthetically how dignity, freedoms, equality and 
solidarity are understood in the Charter and in the case law 
of the European courts. The concluding chapter summarises 
the main insights emerging from the analysis. 
 
We want to thank Isabelle Aubert, Marcus Düwell, 
Volker Heins, and Jos Philips, as well as the monitors assist-
ing in the project assessment, Ferdinando Sigona and Gezim 
Krasniqi, for their useful comments on the Report on the 
11 
Normative Content, Genesis, Historical Background and 
Implementation of the EU Charter. We also express grati-
tude to the coordinator of the NoVaMigra Project, Andreas 
Niederberger.  
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1. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
An Introduction 
The unique supranational organization called “European 
Union” is the ongoing development of a process of regional 
integration which was originally conceived, in the aftermath 
of World War II, as a peace project based primarily on eco-
nomic cooperation (Dinan 2019). For this reason, funda-
mental rights initially remained outside the scope of the Eu-
ropean Communities. However, they became part of the 
process of European integration very soon. Indeed, since 
1969 1, the Court of Justice (now Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union, hereinafter CJEU) has affirmed several times 
that fundamental rights are part of the general principles of 
Community law (now EU law) 2. 
Subsequently, a political process began, which finally 
 
 
1 CJEU, Stauder v. Stadt Ulm, 1969 (C-29/69). See also CJEU, Inter-
nationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Ge-
treide und Futtermittel, 1970 (C-11/70). 
2 With effect from 1 December 2009, date of the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the EU has acquired legal personality and has taken over 
the competences previously conferred on the European Community. 
Community law has therefore become the law of the Union. For simplici-
ty, in this work we will always refer to EU law and use the acronym CJEU 
to indicate the Court of Justice of the European Union, irrespective of 
when an act was adopted or a judgement was pronounced (with the sole 
exception of literal citations). Indeed, although we are aware that this is 
not properly accurate, we think that using different denominations and 
acronyms may be even more confusing. 
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led to the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (hereinafter Charter) in 2000. In par-
ticular, besides a number of non-binding declarations and 
resolutions adopted by the European institutions 3, funda-
mental rights were mentioned in the preamble of The Single 
European Act (1986) and, then, reaffirmed «as general prin-
ciples of Community law» in art. F of Treaty on the Europe-
an Union (hereinafter TEU), signed in Maastricht in 1992. 
In this context, the Charter represents a milestone in the 
process of progressive inclusion of the protection of funda-
mental rights within the political goals and the legal frame-
work of the EU, since it substantially contributed to produc-
ing a qualitative change in the way the EU now describes 
itself: that is, as a “Europe of Rights”. 
This introductory chapter will sketch the genesis of the 
Charter (par. 1.1) and its main features, including its field of 
application and personal scope (par. 1.2). 
1.1. The genesis of the Charter 
The preparatory works that led to the adoption of the 
Charter officially started in 1999 in Cologne, when the Eu-
 
 
3 Among the others: in 1977, the Parliament, the Commission and the 
Council adopted a Declaration on the importance of respecting fundamental 
rights; in 1984, the protection of fundamental rights was reaffirmed in art. 4 
of the draft Treaty on the establishment of the European Union (“Spinelli 
draft”), which, however, was never signed; in 1989, the European Parliament 
adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which «can 
be considered as the first formal ancestor of the [Charter] and was prepared 
“to supplement the Maastricht Treaty”» (Dupré in Peers et al. 2014, 11). 
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ropean Council declared: «There appears to be a need, at the 
present stage of the Union’s development, to establish a 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to make their over-
riding importance and relevance more visible to the Union’s 
citizens» 4. To this purpose, the European Council estab-
lished that «a draft of such a Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union should be elaborated by a body 
composed of representatives of the Heads of State and Gov-
ernment and of the President of the Commission as well as 
of members of the European Parliament and national par-
liaments» 5. This body – which called itself “Convention”, 
to underline the importance of the document it was called to 
elaborate – was led by a Praesidium, which coordinated its 
activities and which finally wrote the Explanations relating 
to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter Explana-
tions), providing official indication of how each article of 
the Charter has been conceived 6. 
The Charter was solemnly proclaimed during the Nice Eu-
ropean Council, in December 2000. At the beginning, it was a 
non-binding document: it was soft law. Nonetheless, the con-
clusions of the Cologne European Council already prefigured 
the possibility to integrate it in the Treaties. In 2004, the pro-
ject of a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which 
would have included the Charter as a very part of its text, 
 
 
4 Annex IV of the Conclusions of the Presidency of the Cologne Euro-
pean Council 3-4 June 1999. 
5 Ibidem. 
6 The Explanations are very important for the interpretation of the 
Charter, insofar as both the preamble (par. 5) and art. 52,7 of the Charter 
itself state that it must be interpreted «with due regard» to the them. 
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failed. However, only three years later, with the Lisbon Trea-
ty, the Charter finally became a primary source of EU law. 
Indeed, art. 6 of the consolidated version of the TEU current-
ly into force states that «The Union recognises the rights, 
freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as 
adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall 
have the same legal value as the Treaties» (emphasis added). 
The Charter was aimed at reaffirming a catalogue of 
fundamental rights that were considered to be already part 
of EU law. In this perspective, the preamble (par. 5) explic-
itly mentions the following reference sources: a) the consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States; b) the in-
ternational obligations common to the Member States; c) the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ECHR); d) the Social 
Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe 
(hereinafter COE): that is, respectively, the Community Char-
ter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (hereinafter 
CCFSRW) and the European Social Charter (hereinafter 
ESC); and e) the case-law of the CJEU and the European 
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR).  
In particular, the ECHR deserves special attention, since 
art. 52,3 of the Charter states: «In so far as this Charter con-
tains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights 
shall be the same as those laid down by the said Conven-
tion», although «This provision shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection». Furthermore, art. 6 
TEU states a clear commitment of the EU to accede to the 
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ECHR, although such accession has not been realised yet 7. 
Therefore, the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR have a 
special role and weight in the interpretation of the Charter. 
Nonetheless, as the Explanations make clear, the Charter 
has been inspired also by other international legal sources, 
in addition to those explicitly mentioned in the preamble. 
Those sources will be recalled in chapters 3-6 below, where 
relevant. 
Therefore, the Charter deeply values its roots in the past 
achievements in the field of fundamental rights. Nonethe-
less, it also looks closely at the present and thinks about the 
future: in fact, as the preamble says, «it is necessary to 
strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the light 
of changes in society, social progress and scientific and 
technological developments» (par. 4), and the «enjoyment 
of these rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard 
to other persons, to the human community and to future 
generations» (par. 6). 
This stance is immediately evident, for instance, in the 
specific provisions on the right to the integrity of the person 
in the fields of medicine and biology (art. 3,2), the right to 
the protection of personal data (art. 8) 8, the environmental 
 
 
7 In this regard, it is worth noting that, in 2010, the European Council 
adopted a Draft revised Agreement on the Accession of the European Un-
ion to the Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. However, the CJEU, required to evaluate the compatibility of 
the draft agreement with the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (hereinafter TFEU), expressed a negative opinion. See 
CJEU, Opinion 2/13, 2014. 
8 In fact, this article stems from the need to protect individuals’ priva-
cy in the “digital era”. 
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protection (art. 37), and the consumer protection (art. 38). In 
addition, the attention to how society has changed in the last 
decades is also reflected in the wording of some of the arti-
cles concerning classical rights, such as the right to marry 
and the right to found a family, recognized in art. 9. In fact, 
this provision is unprecedented in the way it avoids any ref-
erence to men and women, thus letting the way open to 
same-sex marriages, as far as States decide to allow them 9; 
which is also coherent with the prohibition of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation as stated in art. 21 of the Char-
ter. 
1.2. The structure of the Charter, its field of appli-
cation, and its personal scope 
The Charter is composed of six Titles, dedicated, respec-
tively, to dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ 
rights, and justice, plus a final Title containing general pro-
visions for the interpretation and application of the Charter. 
This unconventional structure can be related to the principle 
of the indivisibility and interdependency of fundamental 
rights. The centrality given to this principle – which was a 
leading one also in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (hereinafter UDHR) and was strongly reaffirmed in 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted 
by the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 
 
 
9 On this point, see ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010 (applica-
tion no. 30141/04). 
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on 25 June 1993 10 – marks an important difference with, for 
instance, the COE system, where civil and political rights, 
on the one side, and social rights, on the other, go “at differ-
ent speeds”. In that system, in particular, civil and political 
rights, stated in the ECHR, can count on stronger judicial 
guarantees as compared to social rights, stated in the ESC. 
The field of application of the Charter is defined in art. 
51,1, which states: «The provisions of this Charter are ad-
dressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of 
the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity 
and to the Member States only when they are implementing 
Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe 
the principles and promote the application thereof in ac-
cordance with their respective powers and respecting the 
limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the 
Treaties» (emphases added). Furthermore, art. 51,2 con-
firms that «The Charter does not extend the field of applica-
tion of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or estab-
lish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers 
and tasks as defined in the Treaties».  
The field of application of the Charter is therefore con-
fined within the limits of the scope of EU law. However, 
the CJEU case law proves that the implications of the 
growing EU legislation directly or indirectly concerning 
matters of fundamental right protection may lead to affirm 
the fundamental rights jurisdiction of the EU beyond its 
prima facie limits. Therefore, the “spillover effects” of such 
 
 
10 See, in particular, art. 5 of the Vienna Declaration, which states: 
«All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inter-
related». 
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EU legislation must be taken carefully into account, as they 
may pose multiple challenges for the interaction between 
the European and domestic legal orders (Muir 2014). Fur-
thermore, as regards the duties of the Member States estab-
lished in art. 51,1, it is worth noting that the phrase “im-
plementing Union law” has been interpreted by the CJEU 
in a broad sense, as substantially including every case in 
which States act in the scope of Union law (FRA 2018, 17-
18, 38-39, 58-67) 11, even if they are exercising their so 
called “retained powers” 12.  
As regards the personal scope of the Charter, it has been 
argued that the very decision of dedicating a specific Title – 
Title V – to (a limited number of) citizens’ rights indicates 
the will to stress the universality of all the other rights en-
shrined in the Charter, which are recognized to everyone 
(Paciotti 2010, 41). In this perspective, the preamble (par. 2) 
lists equality as one of the universal and indivisible values 
that found the EU, together with human dignity, freedom 
and solidarity. Here, the Charter seems to assume the idea of 
basic or fundamental equality, understood as a normative 
principle that prescribes to consider all persons as (morally 
and) legally equal, independently from their being “the 
same”, as a matter of fact, in any respect 13. 
 
 
11 Sometimes, the simple fact that the national rules gave effect to an 
EU obligation (even if they did not flow directly from EU law) has been 
enough to trigger EU fundamental rights protection. See, e.g., CJEU, 
Åkerberg Fransson, 2013 (C-617-10). 
12 On the «retained powers formula» in the case law of the CJEU, alt-
hough not specifically in relation to the Charter, see Azoulai (2011).  
13 For philosophical discussions of the idea of basic or fundamental 
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However, there are indications that the situation is ac-
tually more complex. First, the distinction between EU ci-
tizens and third-country nationals re-emerges in different 
parts of the Charter. For instance, art. 15 states that «Every-
one has the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely 
chosen or accepted occupation» (par. 1). However, only EU 
citizens are recognized «the freedom to seek employment, 
to work, to exercise the right of establishment and to pro-
vide services in any Member State» (par. 2), while third-
country nationals are only entitled to working conditions 
equivalent (and not equal) to those of the EU citizens (and 
only if they are authorized to work in the territory of a 
Member State, par. 3). Furthermore, the «right to vote and 
to stand as a candidate at elections» – at both EU (art. 39) 
and municipal (art. 40) level – as well as the «freedom of 
movement and of residence» (art. 45) are placed in Title V 
on Citizens’ Rights. 
Secondly, even when the Charter does not connect rights 
to EU citizenship, it grants several of them in accordance 
with EU and/or Member States law, which actually distin-
guish different entitlements depending on the different sta-
tus of individuals: for instance, refugees and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection 14, beneficiaries of a residence permit 
 
 
equality see Williams (1962); Singer (1979, chap. 2); Veatch (1986, chap. 
2-4); Waldron (2008) and Carter (2011). On the evaluative idea of “equali-
ty as sameness” see MacKinnon (1987) and Gianformaggio (2005). 
14 See the Directive 2011/95/EU (Qualification Directive). As regards 
the standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, see par. 4.1 below, on 
the relation between this directive, the Charter, and the Geneva Conven-
tion on the Status of Refugees (1951). 
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for victims of human trafficking 15, asylum seekers 16, long-
term residents 17, beneficiaries of a family reunification 
permit 18, migrants in an irregular situation and/or in a return 
procedure 19, and so on 20. In particular, while beneficiaries 
of international protection are granted many of the rights 
enshrined in the Charter (including freedom of movement 
and maintenance of family unity, as well as the access to 
employment, education, health care, social welfare, and ac-
commodation) 21, migrants (with the partial exception of 
long-term residents) generally enjoy less favourable condi-
tions (see, in particular, chap. 6 below). 
In this regard, it is meaningful that, while the Charter 
explicitly recognises the right to asylum (see par. 4.1 be-
 
 
15 See the Directive 2004/81/EC (Residence Permit for Victims of An-
ti-Trafficking Directive). 
16 See, in particular, the Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions 
Directive) and the Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 (Dublin Regulation). 
17 See the Directive 2003/109/EC (Long-Term Residents Directive). 
18 See the Directive 2003/86/EC (Family Reunification Directive). 
19 See the Directive 2008/115/EC (Return Directive). 
20 Furthermore, the conditions reserved to third-country nationals may 
vary depending on the existing agreements between their country of origin 
and the EU. 
21 The Qualification Directive grants to the beneficiaries of interna-
tional protection substantially the same rights recognized in the Geneva 
Convention on the Status of Refugees. Differently form that Convention, it 
does not explicitly mention freedom of religion, right to association and 
access to justice. Anyway, art. 20 of the Directive, which opens the chap-
ter on the content of international protection, explicitly states that that 
chapter «shall be without prejudice to the rights laid down in the Geneva 
Convention». 
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low), it is silent on the issue of the right to migrate, and that 
the freedom of movement is recognized to third-country na-
tionals, «in accordance with the Treaties», only if they are 
«legally resident in the territory of a Member State» (art. 
45,2). Furthermore, although the impact on national sover-
eignty of the growing body of EU laws relating to asylum, 
borders and immigration (prominently those concerning the 
Schengen system and the Common European Asylum Sys-
tem – CEAS) has to be considered 22, the decision as to 
whether, and under what conditions, a third-country national 
may be authorized to enter and stay in a Member State 
mainly depends on the legislation of that State. 
The EU legal framework concerning migrants’, asylum 
seekers’ and refugees’ rights is therefore very fragmented 23.
 
 
22 For further information on the Schengen system and the CEAS, see 
FRA (2014). 
23 On the «fragmentation of citizenship within the European Union» 
see Benhabib (2004, chap. 4). 
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2. The Philosophical Background of the Char-
ter 
The Charter may be seen as the last step of the institu-
tional development of the European system of fundamental 
rights. The very idea of fundamental rights as the best way 
to ensure and protect such values as dignity, freedoms, 
equality and solidarity was born and grew in the European 
culture, nourished by philosophical theories, social move-
ments and legal documents (see Facchi 2013). 
While the precise origin of the idea of subjective rights 
and its relation to the tradition of Natural Law are a matter 
of academic discussion (see Tuck 1979; Villey 1983; Tier-
ney 1997), a clear statement of that idea can be found in the 
work of Vitoria (1539), who wrote of subjective rights as 
dominii (properties) of all human beings. Vitoria theorized 
the rights to life, freedom and properties, but also the ius mi-
grandi and the ius occupandi, as rights of all human beings. 
The idea of natural rights was then reformulated by Gro-
tius (1625) and has a central role in Locke’s (1689b) version 
of the social contract theory, which deeply influenced mod-
ern constitutionalism. According to Locke, already in the 
“state of nature”, that is, before the establishment of a civil 
government, human beings have natural rights to life, liberty 
and property. With the social contract, the enforcement of 
natural rights, by preventing or punishing their violations, 
became the major task of a civil government. At the same 
time, respect for those rights represents a constraint to the 
exercise of political authority. 
25 
In the age of the Enlightenment, the idea of natural rights 
became, all over Europe and beyond, a basic element of a 
wide reform project for legal, political, cultural and eco-
nomic orders (see Israel 2009). Theories of natural rights 
provided the ideological background for the Declarations of 
Rights, notably civil and political rights, stated by the 
American and French Revolutions. Those events represent a 
turning point in the history of rights, by translating them 
from abstract moral ideals and aspirations to basic legal 
principles, that would have been variously implemented in 
the legal orders of the national States during the XIX century. 
The history of fundamental rights, in the XIX century 
and the early XX century, have been characterized by two 
different trends. On the one side, by an increasing scepti-
cism about the idea of “natural” rights pre-existing the legal 
order: a scepticism inaugurated, form very different per-
spectives, by Burke, Bentham and Marx in their respective 
criticism of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen (see Waldron 1987) and developed by legal positiv-
ists, from Jellinek (1892) to Kelsen (1934). On the other 
side, by the progressive extension of civil and political 
rights to all the citizens, conceived as equal members of the 
national community, and by the progressive expansion of 
the catalogue of citizens’ rights, with the inclusion of social 
rights, starting from the right to education and workers’ 
rights (see Marshall 1950). In Europe, a full set of social 
rights, including social security rights, was included for the 
first time alongside civil and political rights in a constitu-
tional text in the Weimar Constitution of 1919. 
After the catastrophe of World War II, the idea of human 
rights reappeared with a renewed force, both as the main in-
26 
strument to impose constitutional and international limits to 
governments and determining their tasks and as a guiding 
principle for the reform of international relations. In particu-
lar, at the international level, the UDHR, adopted by the UN 
Assembly in 1948 (see Glendon 2001), is the main symbol 
of this “new era” of human rights: individuals, not only 
States, are recognized as subjects of international law and 
all the persons in the world become human rights holders. 
That idea found a first reaffirmation, in the European con-
text, with the ECHR in 1950 (see Bates 2010). 
Behind the institutional developments lays a rich history 
of ideas and political struggles: their heritage can be found 
in the provisions of the Charter. For the limited purposes of 
this paper we have focused on four traditions characterising 
the European values landscape: Christianity (par. 2.1), Re-
publicanism (par. 2.2), Liberalism (par. 2.3), and Socialism 
(par. 2.4) 1. These four traditions are not independent from 
each other. They often overlap, and it is not always easy to 
define their respective boundaries or to classify an author 
within one of them.  
 
 
1 We decided to focus on these four traditions, because, in our opinion, 
they are those that mainly contributed to the history and culture of funda-
mental rights. While those traditions are central in the history of European 
political thought, that history cannot obviously be reduced to them. Further-
more, we couldn’t account for all the controversies regarding the interpreta-
tion of those traditions and their relations. We inevitably had to simplify im-
portant debates in the history of ideas. For the same reason, we decided to 
consider in the section devoted to the liberal tradition a fundamental element 
of the European value landscape, that is secularism and the separation 
among religious and political spheres, even if we are aware that also the re-
publican and in the socialist traditions contributed to its development. 
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2.1. Christianity 
The contribution of Christianity to the contemporary 
idea of political and legal equality remains ambiguous. 
Christianity, with its idea of the derivation of all human be-
ings from a single ancestor, has played a fundamental role 
in supporting the idea of the basic equality of all human be-
ings (see Veatch 1986, chap. 2-3). That idea was not com-
pletely unknown to the pre-Christian Greek and Roman cul-
ture, and can be found for instance in the Stoic tradition (see 
Cicero 55-51 b.C.). Nevertheless, for the Stoics and for 
many early Christian thinkers as well (see Augustine 426), 
the moral equality of human beings was considered to be 
compatible with the existence of social hierarchies and ine-
qualities of legal status. It is only with the contribution of 
early modern Christian authors in the Natural Law Tradi-
tion, such as Vitoria (1539), Grotius (1625) and, later on, 
Locke (1689b), that the idea of basic moral equality pro-
vides a foundation for the idea of legal equality and natural 
rights of all human beings. 
On the one side, the contemporary idea of moral and le-
gal equality of all human beings, that dates back to the En-
lightenment, can be considered in part as the result of a pro-
cess of secularization and radicalization of the natural law 
tradition that can be found in such authors as Vitoria, Groti-
us and Locke. On the other side, the modern idea of political 
and legal equality emerged from the crisis of the consensus 
on those doctrines, mainly Christian ones, that have provid-
ed for a long time a legitimation for rigid social hierarchies 
(see Filmer 1680) and in opposition to the Ecclesiastical in-
stitutions’ efforts to confine the idea of equality to the moral 
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realm, to neutralize its potential for undermining the tradi-
tional social order. 
Christianity contributed also to the history of the idea of 
human dignity, that is, of the special value of the human be-
ing (see Rosen 2012; Debes 2017). While what is the pre-
cise ground of human dignity is a matter of discussion 
among theologians and scholars, the Christian understand-
ing of human dignity insists on the idea of respect of the 
human person and of its “nature” – including life and physi-
cal integrity – as an absolute limit to human action and 
stresses that such limit applies also to one’s disposal of her-
self/himself, thus creating possible conflicts with the val-
ue/principle of individual autonomy. This understanding of 
human dignity has provided a justification for the political 
and legal struggles against slavery and trade in human be-
ings and still remains central, for instance, as a foundation 
for many Christian positions on bioethical questions (see 
President’s Council on Bioethics 2008). 
2.2. Republicanism 
The Republican tradition goes back to Roman political 
and legal thought (e.g. Cicero 55-51 b.C.) and to the modern 
contribution of such authors as Machiavelli (1531), Locke 
(1689b), Montesquieu (1748) and Rousseau (1762) (see Po-
cock 1975; Skinner 1998). That tradition insists on the im-
portance of the law, of institutional design, prominently 
concerning the relations between powers (separation of 
powers; checks and balances), and of political participation. 
All these aspects are necessary conditions to protect, or even 
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create, freedom in a Republic. According to this idea, free-
dom requires something more than non-interference: it re-
quires non-domination by every power, public and private. 
The idea of freedom, in this perspective, is rooted in the 
roman opposition between liber and servus and is the legacy 
of the Roman tradition of liberty (libertas) as a status, from 
which the idea of freedom as an individual and/or collective 
condition of non-domination develops. Unlike the tradition 
that conceives the law as a limit – maybe a necessary one – 
to individual freedom (a tradition that includes Hobbes 1651 
and Bentham 1789), the republican tradition conceives free-
dom as something that can exist only under the rule of a 
general and abstract law, that protect individuals from arbi-
trary powers of any sort (see, for an actualization, Pettit 
1997). 
While some republican authors – most notably Rousseau 
– were supporters of radical democracy, not all republicans 
support properly democratic institutions and full political 
equality. Nonetheless, all of them stress the importance of 
some form of political participation and civic engagement, 
either as a form of human flourishing (as was typical of 
classical/humanist republicanism) or as a form of guarantee 
against the abuse of political authority (as was typical of 
Machiavellian republicanism). 
2.3. Liberalism 
The contribution of Liberalism to modern constitutional-
ism and to the culture of fundamental rights can hardly be 
overestimated. It can be considered as the ideology of the 
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middle class, functional to the dismantling of the rigid social 
hierarchies typical of the Ancient Regime. Central to this 
tradition are two elements. 
First and foremost, the insistence on the importance of 
protecting individual freedom – understood as something 
pre-existing to political institutions – from the abuses of po-
litical authority, but also from non-political authorities, like 
religious ones, and from the “tyranny of the majority” (see 
Tocqueville 1835-1840 and Mill 1859). This perspective is 
grounded in the theorization of natural rights to life, person-
al freedom and property as inviolable limits to political au-
thority (see, once again, Locke 1689b, and Kant 1797) and 
to the idea that the protection of those rights requires special 
constitutional arrangements, imposing negative and positive 
duties constraining the exercise of political authority. More 
generally, the liberal insistence on the need to protect indi-
vidual liberty is typically grounded in an understanding of 
the importance of personal autonomy and sovereignty (see 
Kant 1785 and Mill 1859) that provides the foundation for 
an understanding of human dignity alternative to the Chris-
tian one. 
As a consequence, central to liberalism is the idea that 
the criminal law and the use of coercion to restrict individu-
al liberty should be limited to the prevention of harm to oth-
ers (an idea paradigmatically defended by Mill 1859, but 
already implicit in the utilitarian conception of punishment 
expressed by Bentham 1789 and Beccaria 1764) 2. 
 
 
2 See also art. 5 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Men and 
Citizenship: «The Law has the right to forbid only those actions that are 
injurious to society». 
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Strictly linked to the valorisation of individual liberty is 
also the contribution of liberalism to the development of the 
modern understanding of the proper relations between polit-
ical and religious authorities. 
All liberals advocated toleration, that is, the principle es-
tablishing that, even if the State supports a specific religion, 
religious liberty should be protected, including, in particu-
lar, the liberty to profess a religion different from the one 
supported by the State. This idea of toleration, initially lim-
ited to different religious views (see Locke 1689a), during 
the Enlightenment is expanded into liberty of conscience 
(Voltaire 1763), and toleration is progressively extended to 
non-religious views. This protection of the liberty of con-
science, together with the protection of freedom of expres-
sion and association, favoured the development in Europe of 
a secular culture and, over time, a general secularization of 
European societies. 
Beyond toleration, many liberals supported more radical 
principles, such as the principle of the separation of Church 
and State, that is between religious and political authorities, 
or even the principle that the State should remain neutral to-
wards different religious perspectives: a neutrality that can be 
understood as requiring that the State abstain from supporting 
religion or as requiring that, if the State supports religion, it 
should supports the different religions in an impartial way. 
Besides individual freedom, a second element which is 
central to the liberal tradition is the critique of social privi-
leges, especially of rigid social hierarchies based on birth 
and, thus, undeserved. That critique is based on the idea that 
social inequalities could be considered justified only when 
grounded on one’s efforts and success in a fair social com-
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petition. This led many authors within the liberal tradition to 
oppose legal barriers excluding certain groups of people 
from social competition to access to education, professions, 
jobs and other social positions (see Smith 1776), but also to 
stress the role of the State in promoting equality of oppor-
tunity, for instance as regards education and a fair distribu-
tion of wealth from one generation to the next (see Mill 
1847). The struggles for the abolition of legal barriers ex-
cluding women and the vindications of equal rights for the 
two sexes (see Wollstonecraft 1792, Taylor 1851, and Mill 
1869) characterised liberal feminism, the so-called “first 
wave” of feminism.  
2.4. Socialism 
Last but not least, the Socialist and, more generally, so-
cial-reformist tradition that can be associated with the work-
er movement and trade-unionism contributed to shape the 
European system of values and fundamental rights. This 
tradition insists on economic equality, or at least reduced 
economic inequality, as a social and political goal, and on 
the material conditions of freedom, on the need to protect 
and empower, also politically, the social groups that are 
more vulnerable to exploitation and social exclusion. 
Anticipated by some radical thinkers in the XVIII centu-
ry (see the criticism of private property and inequality in 
Rousseau 1755), socialism emerged during the XIX century 
in an attempt to confront the social problems produced by 
the Industrial Revolution and to interpret and give voice to 
the needs of the working class. Within socialism, different 
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attitudes emerged toward the language of rights. Marx (1843), 
influenced by Hegel’s (1820) criticism of abstract universal-
ism and individualism, rejected that language, considering it 
to be compromised with liberal individualism and presup-
posing an atomistic and conflictual conception of society. 
Other currents of the Socialist movement were less sceptical 
about the possibility of expressing the needs of the working 
class through that language. Among them, there are those 
social reformers that Marx and Engels (1848) dismissingly 
called Utopian Socialists, such as Saint-Simon, Owen and 
Fourier; the French Solidarists led by Bourgeois (1896) (cf. 
Blais 2007); and the British radical social reformers from 
Mill (1847) to the Fabian Society. 
Socialist ideas, some of them revolutionary, some other 
more reformist, informed the political agenda of the work-
ers’ movements, and their struggles for democratic inclu-
sion, better working conditions and redistribution, which 
contributed to laying the foundations of mass democracy 
and of social reforms, such as the adoption of measures of 
work regulation and social insurance. Those reforms, like 
the Poor Laws in England and the reforms adopted in Ger-
many under Bismarck, that provided the foundations for the 
welfare state, were initially aimed at containing social con-
flict. However, in the early XX century, they finally resulted 
in the idea of social rights being an integral part of the sys-
tem of fundamental rights (Alber 1982; Ritter 1991). 
2.5. Final remarks 
While some of the four traditions that have been briefly 
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considered in the previous paragraphs are older, in the last 
two centuries they have developed alongside each other, of-
ten entering into conflict but also exercising reciprocal in-
fluence. Each of them has evolved in the attempt to respond 
to the challenges of the others and by including some of 
their elements. This has resulted in a hybridization of the 
different traditions, which has facilitated their convergence. 
Thus, for instance, the process of democratization, with the 
progressive recognition of political rights to a larger number 
of people, can hardly be considered the contribution of just 
one of those traditions. Documents such as constitutional 
texts and charters of fundamental rights can be considered 
the result of their fruitful convergence. Nevertheless, the 
complex set of ideas behind those documents, and the ten-
sions between them, often re-emerges in the process of in-
terpreting, applying and implementing their normative con-
tent. 
As this brief overview of the philosophical background 
of the Charter shows the values of human dignity, freedom, 
equality and solidarity express highly polysemic and “philo-
sophically thick” concepts, which are open to several possi-
ble interpretations. The following chapters will try to bring 
out the meaning(s) attributed to these concepts in the Char-
ter and in the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR, keeping 




The concept of dignity is among the more controversial 
ones in the philosophical debate (see Kateb 2011; Rosen 
2012; Waldron 2012; McCruddden 2013; Düwell et al. 
2015; Debes 2017). In the Charter, dignity seems to refer to 
the value of the person as a human being, and, insofar as it 
is common to every and each human being as such, it con-
stitutes the basis of the moral and legal equality of all per-
sons – of their equal moral and legal status – and of their 
equality in fundamental rights. However, like the other char-
ters and declarations of rights which refer to dignity, includ-
ing the UDHR, the Charter does not provide an explicit def-
inition of this concept, nor identifies what/which feature(s) 
confer(s) the person her/his dignity. 
The first Title of the Charter articulates human dignity at 
two different levels. Besides a specific set of more directly 
dignity-related rights (par. 3.2), it also assumes a more ab-
stract and far-reaching understanding of human dignity, es-
tablishing it both as a fundamental right itself – a right with 
a very special status among fundamental rights – and as 
«part of the substance» of all the other rights laid down in 
the Charter (par. 3.1). 
3.1. Dignity as «part of the substance» of all fun-
damental rights 
The more abstract and far-reaching understanding of 
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dignity rests on art. 1, which states: «Human dignity is invi-
olable. It must be respected and protected». Human dignity 
is therefore the very first right enshrined in the Charter. 
Constructing dignity as an autonomous right is something 
new in the landscape of international human rights law, 
where dignity is usually considered not as a right but, rather, 
as the basis of human rights (see, for instance, the preamble 
of the UDHR). The same holds true for the philosophical de-
bate, where dignity, understood as the special status of hu-
man beings or as the value that grounds that special status, is 
not considered as a right in itself but rather as what provides 
a foundation for “human rights” (see, e.g., Griffin 2008). 
Nonetheless, the drafting strategy adopted by the Con-
vention seems to be just a different way to reaffirm the spe-
cial importance assigned to dignity in the light of the indi-
visible character of all fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Charter. Indeed, the Explanations on art. 1 clearly state that 
«The dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental 
right in itself but constitutes the real basis of fundamental 
rights. […] It results that none of the rights laid down in this 
Charter may be used to harm the dignity of another person, 
and that the dignity of the human person is part of the sub-
stance of the rights laid down in this Charter. It must there-
fore be respected, even where a right is restricted». 
These statements can be understood as meaning that all 
the rights included in the Charter – with no distinction be-
tween civil, political, and social rights – have, at their core, 
a “dignity component”, and that, therefore, their implemen-
tation and enforcement are needed, among other things, in 
order to respect and protect human dignity. This does not 
mean that the function of all the fundamental rights stated in 
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the Charter may be entirely reduced to securing human dig-
nity: indeed, the Charter is pluralistic, since the rights it en-
shrines are aimed at protecting a set of values (namely: dig-
nity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizenship, and justice). 
Nor the fact that every right has a “dignity component” im-
plies that the restriction of each of them will always – inevi-
tably and automatically – result in a violation of human dig-
nity. However, the balancing between fundamental rights – 
or between fundamental rights and other relevant public in-
terests – can never go so far as to undermine human dignity, 
and, more in general, human dignity may certainly function 
as a limit to the possibility to restrict other rights beyond the 
threshold which delimits their core “dignity component”. 
In this regard, for instance, the CJEU has recently clari-
fied that, while a certain degree of interference with the 
right to private and family life of asylum seekers may be 
necessary in order to ascertain whether they risk to be per-
secuted for their sexual orientation in their country of origin, 
they cannot be required to describe their sexual practices or 
to provide audio-visual documentation of such practices, 
since this would violate not only their privacy but also their 
human dignity 1. Moreover, human dignity may also be af-
fected by certain violations of the principle of equality in 
several fields, such as, for instance, racial discrimination 
stemming from immigration laws 2, discrimination against 
transsexual people in the workplace 3, and discrimination 
 
 
1 CJEU, A, 2014 (C-148/13). 
2 ECR, East African Asians v. UK, 1973 (applications nos. 4403/70 et al.). 
3 CJEU, P v. S and Cornwall County Councils, 1996 (C-13/94), which 
is, by the way, the first use of dignity by the CJEU. 
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between men and women 4. Finally, the CJEU has clarified 
that respect for human dignity must prevail also on the fun-
damental freedoms enshrined in the European Treaties, such 
as, for instance, the freedom to provide services and the free 
movement of goods 5. 
As it comes to the specific provision of art. 1, human 
dignity is first of all defined as inviolable. This means that 
the duty to respect human dignity does not admit deroga-
tion. Furthermore, art. 1 states that human dignity should be 
both respected and protected. In particular, the duty to re-
spect is especially connected with the negative obligation of 
non-interference. Therefore, EU institutions and Member 
States have to avoid any act which may breach the human 
dignity of an individual 6. As regards the duty to protect, 
there is agreement on the fact that it implies positive obliga-
tions, understood as duties to take active steps to ensure that 
dignity is not breached by other individuals, collective sub-
jects, or public authorities (even of other States). This in-
cludes the duty to protect individuals not only from actual 
breaches but also from potential ones. 
In this perspective, the protection of human dignity im-
plies, for instance, that a State cannot send back migrants or 
 
 
4 CJEU, K.B., 2004 (C-117/01). 
5 CJEU, Omega, 2004 (C-36/02). In this case, the CJEU ruled that 
«Community law does not preclude an economic activity consisting of the 
commercial exploitation of games simulating acts of homicide from being 
made subject to a national prohibition measure adopted on grounds of pro-
tecting public policy by reason of the fact that that activity is an affront to 
human dignity». 
6 See, once again, CJEU, A, 2014 (C-148/13). 
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asylum seekers to their country of origin if that country is 
not a safe one and, therefore, they are likely to suffer inhu-
man or degrading treatments or the violation of their right to 
life 7; nor it can deny subsidiary protection to a third-country 
national who suffers of a severe illness if he/she could not 
receive the appropriate health care assistance in his/her 
country of origin 8. 
Furthermore, a State may be held responsible for not 
providing the necessary protection to victims of domestic 
and sexual violence 9. In this regard, it is worth noting that, 
 
 
7 See, e.g., ECtHR, L.M. and Others v. Russia, 2015 (applications nos. 
40081/14 et al.). This is clearly stated in art. 19 of the Charter (see par. 4.1 
below), but it is worth noting the important role that human dignity plays 
in interpreting that article. See also CJEU, N. S. and Others, 2011 (C-
411/10), where the Court ruled that a Member State may not even transfer 
an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible to examine her/his asy-
lum application within the meaning of the Dublin Regulation (establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States 
by a third-country national), when it cannot be unaware that systemic defi-
ciencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum 
seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing 
that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhu-
man or degrading treatment. Such ruling is explicitly based, among other 
things, on the need to respect human dignity as enshrined in art. 1 of the 
Charter (see par. 15 and 123,3 of the judgement). 
8 See, in particular, CJEU, Abdida, 2014 (C-562/13). Dignity (as recalled 
in the preamble of Directive 2008/115/EC) is explicitly mentioned also in 
this judgement (par. 11 and 42), although the decision is primarily based on 
articles 19,2 and 47 of the Charter. In the same line, see also, e.g., CJEU, 
M’Bodj, 2014 (C-542/13); ECtHR, D v. UK, 1997 (application no. 30240/96); 
ECtHR, Paposhvili v. Belgium, 2016 (application no. 41738/10). 
9 See, e.g., ECtHR, Halime Kiliç v. Turkey, 2016 (application no. 
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in the case of migrant women, the COE’s Istanbul Conven-
tion (articles 59-61) directly connects domestic and gender-
based violence to the right of the victims to obtain subsidi-
ary international protection (see Parolari 2014). More in 
general, the Resolution no. 1478/2006 on Integration of 
Immigrant Women in Europe, adopted by the COE Parlia-
mentary Assembly, affirms that «It is the responsibility of 
the member states of the Council of Europe to protect wom-
en against violations of their rights, promote and implement 
full gender equality and accept no cultural or religious rela-
tivism in the field of women’s fundamental rights» (par. 5). 
This goal must be pursued by the States through the wide 
set of measures listed in par. 7 of the Resolution, which in-
cludes several positive obligations. 
It is controversial whether positive obligations include 
also the duty to deliver special services, such as, for in-
stance, granting minimum subsistence means (Olivetti in 
Bifulco et al. 2001). However, the case law shows that dig-
 
 
63034/11), and ECtHR, M.G. v. Turkey, 2016 (application no. 646/10) on 
domestic violence, where the court ruled that the failure of the State to 
protect the victim amounted, respectively, to a violation of the right to life 
and of the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment. See also EC-
tHR, S.W. v. UK, 1995 (application no. 20166/92), where the ECtHR ruled 
that the conviction of man for raping his wife does not constitute a viola-
tion of his right to private and family life, and explicitly stated that «the 
abandonment of the unacceptable idea of a husband being immune against 
prosecution for rape of his wife was in conformity not only with a civi-
lised concept of marriage but also, and above all, with the fundamental 
objectives of the Convention, the very essence of which is respect for hu-
man dignity and human freedom» (par. 44). The duty to protect the victim 
extends to the criminal proceedings against her aggressor: see, e.g., EC-
tHR, Y v. Slovenia, 2015 (application no. 41107/10). 
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nity may play a role also in this sense. For instance, the 
CJUE has established that «the general scheme and purpose 
of Directive 2003/9/EC 10 and the observance of fundamen-
tal rights, in particular the requirements of art. 1 of the 
Charter […], preclude the asylum seeker from being de-
prived – even for a temporary period of time after the mak-
ing of the application for asylum and before being actually 
transferred to the responsible Member State – of the protec-
tion of the minimum standards laid down by that directive». 
Accordingly, a «Member State must ensure that the total 
amount of the financial allowances covering the material 
reception conditions is sufficient to ensure a dignified 
standard of living and adequate for the health of applicants 
and capable of ensuring their subsistence, enabling them in 
particular to find housing, having regard, if necessary, to the 
preservation of the interests of persons having specific 
needs» 11. 
Furthermore, the CJEU had already affirmed in the past 
 
 
10 Directive 2003/9/EC, laying down standards for the reception of ap-
plicants for international protection, has been repealed by Directive 
2013/33/EU, which still refers to dignity in its “Whereas” no. 35: «This 
Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles rec-
ognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Europe-
an Union. In particular, this Directive seeks to ensure full respect for hu-
man dignity and to promote the application of articles 1, 4, 6, 7, 18, 21, 24 
and 47 of the Charter and has to be implemented accordingly». 
11 CJEU, Saciri and Others, 2014 (C-79/13), par. 35 and par. 52. And 
the same goes, on the basis of Directive 2011/95/EU, for refugees who 
have been revoked their residence permit as long as they are in the territo-
ry of the State. See CJEU, T, 2015 (C-373/13) and, more recently, CJEU, 
M (Révocation du statut de réfugié), 2019 (joined cases C-391/16 et al.). 
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that the right to free movement of «Community workers» 
cannot be exercised with dignity if the best possible condi-
tions for the integration of the worker’s family in the society 
of the hosting State are not granted. These conditions in-
clude, inter alia, equal treatment in relation to the access of 
the worker’s family to housing services 12, and the access of 
the worker’s children to education services 13. 
3.2. Specific dignity-related rights 
Title I of the Charter identifies also a specific set of 
rights, thus suggesting that they have a special link with 
human dignity. These rights are: the right to life (art. 2), 
which includes the prohibition of the death penalty 14; the 
 
 
12 CJEU, Focheri v. Belgian State, 1983 (C-152/82). 
13 CJEU, Di Leo v. Land Berlin, 1990 (C-308/89). 
14 This seems worth noting, since the prohibition of death penalty rep-
resents a distinctive feature of the European system of fundamental rights, 
as compared, for instance, to the US system. According to the Explana-
tions, the scope of art. 2 is the same of Protocol no. 6 to the ECHR (adopt-
ed in 1983), which states the prohibition of the death penalty during 
peacetime. However, Protocol no. 13 to ECHR (adopted in 2002) now 
prohibits death penalty in every circumstance. It seems therefore unlikely 
that the reference to Protocol no. 6 may ever lead to consider death penalty 
as admissible, given that, according to art. 53 of the Charter, «Nothing in 
this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields 
of application, by Union law and international law and by international 
agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, includ-
ing the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions». 
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right to the physical and mental integrity of the person (art. 
3), which includes the prohibition of eugenic practices and 
of the reproductive cloning of human beings; the right not to 
be tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment (art. 4) 15; and the right not to be reduced into 
slavery or forced to work (art. 5) 16, including the prohibi-
tion of human trafficking. Taken together, these rights could 
be considered as the core content of the right to human dig-
nity, that is, as those rights the violation of which can be 
recognised, by itself, as a violation of human dignity, irre-
spective of what specific account of this concept is adopted. 
The rights that the Charter considers specifically dignity-
related are traditionally classified as civil rights and consid-
ered to be basic freedoms 17. Sometimes they are qualified 
as negative freedoms, that is, freedoms not to be harmed (or 
freedoms from harm), and distinguished from the positive 
freedoms to do something (see Ferrajoli 2007, chap. 15). It 
is significant that the drafters of the Charter decided to di-
vide basic freedoms into two sets and to classify some of 
them under Dignity, thus conferring them a special value in 
the system of fundamental rights. 
The unifying feature of the rights enshrined in articles 2-
5 could be found in the fact that they express the Kantian 
idea that human beings should always be considered as 
 
 
15 The scope and the meaning of this right is the same of art. 3 ECHR. 
16 The scope and the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article is 
the same of art. 4 ECHR. 
17 It is worth noting, for instance, that the integrity of the person is pro-
tected by the ECtHR as an aspect of the right to private life enshrined in 
art. 8 ECHR. 
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“ends in themselves”, that is, as beings capable of choosing 
their own ends and pursuing them (two capabilities that 
should be preserved in any circumstance) 18. As a conse-
quence, no human being can ever be treated only as a mean 
for the satisfaction of someone else’s ends (either individual 
or collective) and/or reduced to a “thing” that can be used as 
an instrument, or even commercialized. In this perspective, 
articles 3,2 19 and 5,3 20 – which contain two of the most in-
novative provisions of the Charter, as compared to previous 
human rights instruments of general scope – deserve partic-
ular attention. 
In particular, resting on the principles laid down in the 
COE’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
(Oviedo Convention) 21, which establishes a strong relation 
between dignity and the integrity of the person, art. 3,2 
draws attention to the issue of self-determination and its 
limits 22. Indeed, on the one side, art. 3,2 (a) states that no 
person can be subjected to a medical treatment or experi-
ment without her/his informed consent. On the other side, as 
 
 
18 On the Kantian idea of dignity see Hill (1992). 
19 «In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be re-
spected in particular: (a) the free and informed consent of the person con-
cerned, according to the procedures laid down by law, (b) the prohibition 
of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of persons, 
(c) the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a 
source of financial gain, (d) the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of 
human beings». 
20 «Trafficking in human beings is prohibited». 
21 See the Explanations. 
22 On the concept of dignity in bioethics and biolaw see Beyleveld and 
Brownsword (2001); President’s Council of Bioethics (2008). 
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far as the most problematic bioethical issues are concerned, 
art. 3,2 (b) (c) and (d) set limits to what people can consent 
to, establishing that (selective) eugenics practices, commer-
cialization of the human body and its parts 23, and reproduc-
tive cloning of human beings are in any case inadmissible. 
Finally, as regards the issue of reducing human beings to 
a “thing” that can be used as an instrument, or even com-
mercialized, the explicit prohibition of human trafficking 
established in art. 5,3 is particularly remarkable. According 
to the Explanations, this provision «stems directly from hu-
man dignity and takes account of recent developments in 
organised crime, such as the organisation of lucrative illegal 
immigration or sexual exploitation networks» 24. As the EC-
tHR has pointed out, States have a duty to take active steps 
to repress such criminal activities, clarifying that this in-
cludes, for instance, the duty to take seriously individual 
criminal complaints of being victim of human trafficking 
 
 
23 In this regard, it is worth noting that the ECtHR has ruled that also 
the donation, for scientific research, of embryos stemming from in vitro 
fertilization can be legitimately prohibited (ECtHR, Parrillo v. Italy, 2015, 
application no. 46470/11). However, in the case of organisms which are 
not capable of developing into a human being (e.g., un-fertilized human 
eggs), and which cannot therefore be considered human embryos, com-
mercialization has been held to be admissible: see CJEU, International 
Stem Cell, 2014 (C-364/13). More in general, on the relation between bi-
omedical inventions and human dignity see, in particular, CJEU, Nether-
lands v. Parliament and Council, 2001 (C-377/98). 
24 The Explanations refer to the Annex to the Europol Convention for 
the definition of trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation, and to 
Chapter IV of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement on 
the issue of illegal immigration networks. 
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and/or of being forced to prostitution 25. In this perspective, 
the Directive 2011/36/EU (replacing the Council Frame-
work Decision 2002/629/JHA) provides binding legislation: 
it takes a victim-centred approach to cover actions in differ-
ent areas such as prevention activities, criminal law provi-
sions, prosecution of offenders, victims’ support, and vic-
tims’ rights in criminal proceedings. The particular attention 
to children and to the gender perspective gives additional 
value to this directive. 
 
 
25 ECtHR, L.E. v. Greece, 2016 (application no. 71545/12). In this 
case, the applicant was a Nigerian woman who complained that the person 
who helped her to arrive in Greece (in return for a debt pledge of EUR 
40,000) confiscated her passport and forced her to work as a prostitute. 
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4. Freedoms 
The preamble of the Charter states that the EU «places 
the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing 
the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of 
freedom, security and justice» (par. 2). Therefore, differ-
ently from dignity (which is considered inherent to human 
beings, and thus representing a pre-existing limit to the ex-
ercise of power by public authorities and private subjects), 
freedom is understood as something which needs to, and 
must, be created. As pointed out in par. 2.2 above, this 
conception is distinctive of the republican tradition of 
freedom and is paradigmatically expressed by the idea that 
«the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve 
and enlarge freedom» (Locke 1689b, VI, 57; cf. Pettit 
1997). 
The preamble also affirms that «To this end, it is neces-
sary to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights» 
(par. 4). It results that, according to the Charter, freedom, as 
a value, is a political goal, to be reached through the guaran-
tee of fundamental rights. In this perspective, freedom is not 
considered antithetical to security – as it is often depicted at 
present times – but, rather, complementary to it: there is no 
freedom without the security of individual rights. Not by 
chance, the complementarity between freedom and securi-
ty is reaffirmed in the first article of Title II, which states 
the right to liberty and security (art. 6), where liberty re-
fers to habeas corpus and the other guarantees protecting 
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individuals from the arbitrary curtailing of their rights  1. 
As widely recognized, the fundamental right to freedom 
needs to be specified in order to be implemented, since the 
protection of one person’s freedom to do something neces-
sarily implies the restriction of the freedom of others to in-
terfere (see Dworkin 1977, chap. 12). Therefore, a legal sys-
tem cannot avoid selecting a set of freedoms as basic or 
fundamental (as compared to others which does not deserve 
that status; see Rawls 1993, chap. 8), on the basis of an ap-
preciation of their respective value. In this perspective, the 
Charter articulates its particular understanding of the value 
of freedom through a catalogue of freedoms 2. 
 
 
1 The Explanations clarifies that art. 6 of the Charter has the same 
meaning and scope of art. 5 ECHR, that lists the traditional habeas corpus 
rights. These rights became relevant for the EU activities after that, with 
the Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon Treaties, immigration, asylum and as-
pects of criminal justice have come to fall within EU competences. In-
deed, «With the increasing integration of these functions provided for by 
the creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, there are now 
significant fields where the scope of Union law extends to matters that 
potentially engage Article 6» (Wilsher in Peers et al. 2014, 122). 
2 These freedoms are: the already mentioned «right to liberty and secu-
rity» (art. 6), the right to «respect for private and family life» (art. 7), the 
right to «protection of personal data» (art. 8), the «right to marry and the 
right found a family» (art. 9), the «freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion» (art. 10), the «freedom of expression and information» (art. 11), 
the «freedom of assembly and association» (art. 12), the «freedom of arts 
and sciences» (art. 13), the «right to education» (art. 14), the «freedom to 
choose an occupation and the right to engage in a work» (art. 15), the 
«freedom to conduct a business» (art. 16), the «right to property» (art. 17), 
the «right to asylum» (art. 18), and the right to «protection in the event of 
removal, expulsion or extradition» (art. 19). 
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All the freedoms stated in Title II may be reconducted to 
the idea of freedom to do (or not do) something, as distinct 
from the idea of freedom from those violations of funda-
mental rights which impinge directly on human dignity (see 
par. 3.2 above). Nonetheless, as well as the rights enshrined 
in Title I on Dignity, also freedoms contained in Title II en-
tail not only a duty of non-interference, but also a positive 
obligation of the State to adopt all the necessary measures to 
grant the conditions for their effective enjoyment, including 
the protection against possible violations committed by pri-
vate (individual or collective) subjects. 
A comprehensive overview of all the articles contained 
in Title II would exceed the scope and aims of this work. In 
the following paragraphs, we will consider the general con-
ception of freedom – a substantive one – that emerges from 
the Charter (par. 4.1) and then focus on the rights to private 
and family life and marriage (par. 4.2) and on the right to 
freedom of religion (par. 4.3), that seem to be particularly 
relevant for our analysis, as far as refugees, asylum seekers, 
and migrants in general are concerned 3. The case law of 
the ECtHR and the CJEU on these rights provides further 
examples of how the protection of fundamental freedoms 
can imply positive obligations for the States, thus support-




3 Not by chance, the principle of unity of the family and the freedom 
of refugees to practice their religion in the host country are given special 
weight also in the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees. 
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4.1. A substantive idea of freedom 
The Charter opens to a substantive idea of freedom, un-
derstood as an effective possibility to exercise one’s free-
dom, which may require the positive intervention of public 
authorities. This may recall Amartya Sen’s idea of a «capa-
bility approach» to freedom (Sen 1999, 2009; cf. Nussbaum 
2011) 4. A meaningful indication of that is the fact that Title 
II includes rights which are not freedoms in a strict sense, 
but that may be conceived as necessary conditions for the 
effective enjoyment of such freedoms. This is the case, in 
particular, of the right to education (art. 14), the right to asy-
lum (art. 18) and the right to protection in case of removal, 
expulsion or extradition (art. 19). 
First of all, the placement of the right to education in Ti-
tle II on Freedoms is particularly meaningful 5. Indeed, the 
right to education is traditionally considered a social right 
that entails positive obligations for the State, understood in 
 
 
4 On the different concepts and conceptions of freedom see Carter, 
Kramer and Steiner (2007); Schmidtz and Pavel (2018). Classical refer-
ences in the debate on the concepts of freedom are Berlin (1958); Oppen-
heim (1961); and MacCallum (1967). 
5 The same cannot be said with regard to art. 15 on the right to engage 
in a work. Indeed, this right is conceived as a freedom in a strict sense, and 
not as a right to actually have a job, which would imply an obligation for 
the States to maintain a high and stable level of employment (see also par. 
6.1 below). On this, see e.g. Ashiagbor in Peers et al. (2014, 430-431), who 
also underlines that «the right to work as contained in Article 15 [of the 
Charter] has a relatively narrow theoretical basis, when compared with the 
way in which the right to work is recognized in ILO, Council of Europe or 
UN instruments». In the same sense, see Nogler in Peers et al. (2014, 286). 
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the strong sense of a duty to provide a service. In this re-
gard, it is particularly worth noting that art. 14,2 expressly 
states that the right to education includes «the possibility to 
receive free compulsory education» (emphasis added) 6. 
Like in the case of dignity, this not only confirms that the 
Charter adopts an unprecedented articulation of the cata-
logue of fundamental rights, but also reaffirms the indivisi-
bility and complementarity of those rights (Salazar in Mas-
troianni et al. 2017, 270). Indeed, due to its empowering po-
tential, the right to education may be understood as an es-
sential condition of the full enjoyment of any other right (as 
already recognized by Condorcet 1791). 
Secondly, the inclusion of articles 18 and 19 in the Title 
on Freedoms deserves attention. In particular, the right to 
asylum (art. 18) is a necessary precondition of the oppor-
tunity to enjoy those fundamental freedoms which could be 
denied under oppressive regimes. As regards the scope of 
art. 18, the Charter recognizes the right to asylum in accord-
ance with what is established by the Geneva Convention on 
the Status of Refugees (1951), meaning that it only applies 
to persons who are, or risk to be, persecuted for their race, 
religion, nationality, political opinions, or belonging to a 
particular social group 7. Therefore, the so called “humani-
 
 
6 This provision, which rests on international human rights instruments 
such as the UDHR (art. 26), the ESC (art. 17), and the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 13), marks a significant 
difference from art. 2 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR, despite the fact that, 
according to the Explanations, the latter represents the basis of art. 14 of 
the Charter. 
7 These are also the grounds that art. 10 of the Directive 2011/95/EU 
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tarian refugees”, who escape not from personal persecution 
but from a general lack of protection of their rights, fall out-
side the scope of art. 18. This limitation has severe conse-
quences, in particular, for people escaping from territories 
of war, but it may also affect other situations. For instance, 
some NGOs submitted observations to the Convention 
which was drafting the Charter calling attention to the rele-
vance of practices such as female genital mutilation or other 
forms of gender-based violence, but the intention to estab-
lish only a minimum standard of protection did prevail (see 
Brunelli in Bifulco et al. 2001) 8. 
However, at least a partial compensation of such a re-
strictive approach may be found in art. 19 on the protection 
in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition. In fact, it 
applies not only to refugees in the strict sense (meaning, 
those persons who have been legally recognized as such), 
but rather to foreigners in general. Furthermore, art. 19 not 
only reproduces the principle of non-refoulement as af-
firmed in art. 33 of the Geneva Convention and in art. 4 of 
Protocol no. 4 to ECHR 9. Rather, it also transposes the rel-
evant ECtHR case law on the right to life and the prohibi-
tion of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and 
 
 
(Qualification Directive) considers to be relevant for the assessment of 
whether asylum should actually be granted. 
8 In this regard, see also the COE Resolution no. 1478/2006 on Inte-
gration of Immigrant Women in Europe, which calls on the States to «take 
fully into account gender specific forms of persecution when examining 
women’s claims for asylum» (par. 7.2). 
9 See also art. 21 of the Directive 2011/95/EU (Qualification Di-
rective). 
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punishments, which goes beyond the concept of persecu-
tion, strictly understood.  
Therefore, a State may be held responsible for the expul-
sion or extradition of a person who risks to be subjected to 
death penalty 10, or to suffer inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment 11. Responsibility under art. 19 may arise also 
when threats does not come from the authorities of another 
State but from individuals or private groups within it, if that 
State is not able to provide the necessary protection 12. More-
over, when an individual is a member of a group which is 
subject to systematic ill-treatment, it may not be necessary 
to give evidence of personal risk factors 13. 
In this perspective, art. 15 of the Directive 2011/95/EU 
(Qualification Directive) imposes the duty to concede subsid-
iary protection to those persons who do not qualify as refu-
gees but who, if returned to their country of origin, would 
face a real risk of suffering serious harm – defined, once 
again, as death penalty or execution, torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment – or serious threats to 
their life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in 
situations of international or internal armed conflict 14. Pre-
 
 
10 Art. 19,2 of the Charter. In this regard, see, e.g, ECtHR, Ocalan v. 
Turkey, 2005 (application no. 46221/99) and ECtHR, Bader and Kanbor v. 
Sweeden, 2005 (application no. 13284/04). 
11 See, among many others, ECtHR, Ahmed v. Austria, 1996 (application 
no. 25964/94); ECtHR, Chahal v. UK, 1996 (application no. 22414/93). 
12 See, e.g., ECtHR, H.L.R. v. France, 1997 (application no. 24573/94). 
13 See, e.g., ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands (application no. 
1948/04). 
14 See, e.g., CJEU, Elgafaji, 2009 (C-465/07). 
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cisely on the basis of this directive, in conjunction with arti-
cles 4 and 19 of the Charter, the CJEU has recently estab-
lished that even a third-country national who has been de-
nied or revoked the refugee status after being convicted of 
an offense cannot be deprived of subsidiary protection when 
the conditions for its granting are met 15. 
Articles 18 and 19 must also be read in conjunction with 
art. 6 on the right to liberty and security, and art. 47 on the 
right to an effective remedy. 
In particular, in the field of migration and asylum there 
are many measures impinging on personal liberty as stated 
in art. 6. In particular, under EU law deprivation of liberty is 
regulated by the Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions 
Directive, art. 8) and the Regulation (EU) no 604/2013 (Dub-
lin Regulation, art. 28) for asylum seekers, and by Directive 
2008/115/EC (Return Directive, art. 15) for person in return 
procedures 16. 
Although art. 5,1(f) ECHR includes in its exhaustive list 
of grounds for detention the need to prevent unauthorized 
entry or to facilitate the removal of a person from the coun-
try, the ECtHR has fixed strict conditions for lawful arrests 
or detentions. In particular, detention should be necessary, 
proportionate and not arbitrary, and any other effective 
measure (including less intrusive forms of restriction on the 
freedom of movement) should be unavailable 17. Also, a rea-
 
 
15 See CJEU, M (Révocation du statut de réfugié), 2019 (joined cases 
C-391/16 et al.). 
16 For more details, see FRA (2014). 
17 See, e.g., ECtHR, Mikolenko v. Estonia, 2009 (application no. 
10664/05) and ECtHR, Rusu v. Austria, 2008 (application no. 34082/02). 
55 
sonable limit for its duration must be established by the law 
and respected by public authorities 18. Furthermore, the EC-
tHR has condemned several times the detention of irregular 
migrants without a statutory basis and without an adequate 
motivation 19. In this perspective, the CJUE has stated that 
the «Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as precluding 
legislation of a Member State which permits a third country 
national in respect of whom the return procedure established 
by that directive has not yet been completed to be impris-
oned merely on account of illegal entry across an internal 
border, resulting in an illegal stay» 20. 
Finally, in order to protect the rights enshrined in articles 
18 and 19, an effective remedy against their violations must 
be provided (art. 47). The right to an effective remedy may 
be held to be violated, for instance, if no suspensive effect is 
foreseen for the case of appeal against a decision of remov-
al, when returning the person to her/his country of origin 
may have potentially irreversible effects 21; if there is no 
procedure through which a detainee may ask for a judicial 
 
 
18 See, e.g., ECtHR, Azimov v. Russia, 2013 (application no. 67474/11); 
ECtHR, Mathloom v. Greece, 2012 (application no. 48883/07); ECtHR, 
Auad v. Bulgaria, 2011 (application no. 46390/10). See also CJEU, Kad-
zoev, 2009 (C-357/09). 
19 See, e.g., ECtHR, Khlaifia et al. c. Italia, 2016 (application no. 
16483/12); ECtHR, Buzadji c. The Republic of Moldova, 2016 (application 
no. 23755/07); ECtHR, Mergen and Others v. Turkey, 2016 (applications 
nos. 44062/09 et al.). 
20 CJEU, Affum, 2016 (C-47/15), par. 93. 
21 See, e.g., ECtHR, Gebremedhin v. France, 2007 (application no. 
25389/05). 
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re-examination of the lawfulness of her/his detention 22; if 
administrative and practical barriers hinder the ability of the 
applicants to pursue their asylum claims 23; if legal assis-
tance is not practically available to the applicant 24; or if a 
State does not conduct a rigorous scrutiny of the asylum ap-
plication 25. In this perspective, the ECtHR has found, for 
instance, that pushing back migrants and asylum seekers at 
sea violates, among other things, their right to an effective 
remedy 26. 
Many of these judicial achievements concerning deten-
tion and remedies are now explicitly stated, with regard to 
asylum seekers, also in the Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 
(Dublin Regulation). 
4.2. Private and family life and marriage 
Art. 7 concerns the respect for private and family life. 
The relation between these two dimensions is complex and 
sometimes ambivalent. On the one side, there are cases in 
which private life has been kept distinct from family life 
 
 
22 See, e.g., ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 2009 (appli-
cation no. 30471/08). 
23 See, e.g., ECtHR, Conka v. Belgium, 2002 (application no. 51564/99). 
24 See, e.g., ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 2011 (application 
no. 30696/09). 
25 See, e.g., ECtHR, Singh and Others v. Belgium, 2012 (application 
no. 33210/11). 
26 See, e.g., ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 2012 (applica-
tion no. 27765/09). 
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(although respect for the former «must also comprise, to a 
certain degree, the right to establish and develop relation-
ships with other human beings» 27). For instance, the right to 
private life is the main reference in relation to the issue of 
the treatment of personal data, which are also protected in 
art. 8. Furthermore, reproductive and sexual life are often 
dealt with in the light of private life. For instance, the EC-
tHR has found a violation of private life in making gender 
reassignment surgery conditional on the proof that the per-
son concerned is no longer able to procreate 28, whereas it 
has affirmed that the right to private life could not be inter-
preted as conferring a right to abortion 29. On its side, the 
CJEU has stated that requiring asylum seekers on the 
ground of sexual orientation to go into details about their 
sexual life constitutes a violation not only of their dignity 
(see par. 3.1 above) but also of their right to private life 30. 
By contrast, in many other cases, private and family life 
are treated as strictly interconnected and can hardly be dis-
tinguished. In this respect, art. 7 may partially overlap with 
the right to marry and the right to found a family affirmed in 
art. 9. About this, it must be underlined that neither the Char-
 
 
27 ECtHR, Niemietz v. Germany, 1992 (application no. 13710/88), par. 
29. See also ECtHR, Omojudi v. UK, 2009 (application no. 1820/08). 
28 ECtHR, Y.Y. c. Turkey, 2015 (application no. 1820/08). 
29 ECtHR, A, B and C v. Ireland, 2010 (application no. 25579/05). Af-
firming that the right to private life does not imply a right to abortion, the 
ECtHR came to an opposite conclusion from that of the US Supreme 
Court in the landmark case Roe v. Wade, 1973, which affirmed the right of 
women to choose an abortion, grounding it precisely on the right to privacy. 
30 CJEU, A, 2014 (C-148/13). 
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ter and the ECHR, nor the case law of the CJEU and ECtHR, 
contain a definition of family, while an empirical approach 
is usually adopted in order to evaluate whether a concrete 
situation may fall into that notion 31. However, not every 
claimed expression of family life is protected, even when it 
is allegedly based on marriage. 
In this regard, restrictions on the rights enshrined in arti-
cles 7 and 9 may interact with the issue of respect for the 
cultural traditions of migrants, asylum seekers, and refu-
gees. For instance, the ECtHR has established that the re-
moval of an Afghan man under the Dublin Regulation fol-
lowing the refusal to recognise his marriage to his 14-year-
old bride did not constitute a violation of his right to family 
life, thus indicating that child-marriages are not protected 32. 
Analogously, forced marriages (of both children and adults) 
are expressly prohibited by the Istanbul Convention (art. 
37). That is not surprising, since it is undisputed that the 
right to marry includes the right to choose one’s own spouse 
and, also, the negative right not to marry. Furthermore, there 
is no obligation for the States to recognise religious-only 
marriages 33, while it is held to be legitimate the refusal to 
recognise the effects of a polygamous marriage 34, or to 
grant a residence permit to a polygamous spouse 35. It must 
also be remembered that respect for family life does not 
 
 
31 See, e.g., ECtHR, X,Y and Z v. UK, 1997 (application no. 21830/93). 
32 ECtHR, Z.H. and R.H. v. Switzerland, 2015 (application no. 
60119/12). 
33 ECtHR, Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey, 2010 (application no. 3976/05). 
34 Ibidem. 
35 ECR, E.A and A.A. v. the Netherlands, 1992 (application no. 14501/89). 
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prevent State interference when the rights of a member of 
the family are violated, as for the case of domestic and gen-
der-based violence. On the contrary, in these cases the State 
has a positive duty to protect the victims (see par. 3.1 
above). 
In the CJEU case law, family life issues are often dealt 
with in connection with the right to freedom of movement 
and, in particular, with the concession (or denial) of resi-
dence permits. In this perspective, the unity of the family 
and the consideration of the best interest of the child have 
been given particular importance in some cases. For instan-
ce, on the one side, the CJEU has stated that «the removal of 
a person from the country where close members of his fami-
ly are living may amount to an infringement of the right to 
respect for family life» 36, and that the family reunion should 
be permitted even if a third-country national entered the ter-
ritory of the State irregularly and married her/his EU spouse 
during the period of irregular permanence 37. On the other 
side, the CJEU has affirmed that a third-country national whose 
dependent minor children are EU citizens has to be granted 
a residence and work permit, in order to live with and sup-
port them 38. 
More in general, the right of the children not to be sepa-
rated from their parents is held in great consideration also 
by the ECtHR, both for granting children the admission to 
 
 
36 CJEU, Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, 2004 (joined cases C-482/01 and 
C-493/01), par. 98. See also CJEU, Carpenter, 2002 (C-60/00). 
37 CJEU, Metock and Others, 2008 (C-127/08). 
38 CJEU, Ruiz Zambrano, 2011 (C-34/09), which, however, refers to 
art. 20 TFEU rather than to art. 7 of the Charter. 
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enter in a European country for family reunification 39 and 
for preventing the expulsion of one of the parents following 
a relationship breakdown 40. In this perspective, it must also 
be stressed that art. 24,3 of the Charter states that «Every 
child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a 
personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her 
parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests». This 
does not mean that articles 7 and 24 of the Charter deprive 
States of their discretionary power in the examination of ap-
plications for family reunification 41; however, it does mean 
that States have a duty to examine such applications in the 
light of those articles 42. 
4.3. Freedom of religion 
While art. 10 does not cover only freedom of religion, 
but also freedom of thought and conscience (including, for 
 
 
39 ECtHR, Sen v. the Netherlands, 2001 (application no. 31465/96); 
ECtHR, Osman v. Denmark, 2011 (application no. 38058/09). 
40 ECtHR, Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 1988 (application no. 
10730/84). 
41 Meaningfully, in cases similar to Ruiz Zambrano (see footnote no. 
38 above), the CJEU denied the existence of a right to be granted a resi-
dence permit, on the basis that children where not dependent on the appli-
cant. See, e.g., CJEU, Dereci and Others, 2011 (C-256/11). 
42 CJEU, Rahman and Others, 2012 (C-83/11). See also CJEU, 
Rendón Marín, 2016 (C-165/14), which explicitly relies on art. 7 of the 
Charter, read in conjunction with the obligation to take into consideration 
the child’s best interests, recognised in art. 24,3. 
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instance, pacifism 43, veganism 44, and opposition to abor-
tion 45), issues concerning religion are prevalent in the case 
law. In particular, the CJEU has recognised that «Freedom of 
religion is one of the foundations of a democratic society and 
is a basic human right» 46. Accordingly, EU law prohibits any 
discrimination based on this ground (not only in art. 21 of the 
Charter but also in the secondary law such as, in particular, 
the Directive 78/2000/CE establishing a general framework 
for equal treatment in employment and occupation). 
The CJEU has recognised that the freedom to manifest 
one’s own beliefs is no less important than the freedom to 
hold such beliefs. This means, for instance, that the risk of 
being persecuted for manifesting religion beliefs may repre-
sent the basis for the concession of asylum 47. However, 
while, in the forum internum, freedom of religion (including 
the right to change one’s religion and the right not to adhere 
to any religion) is held to be almost absolute, by contrast, in 
the forum externum, freedom to manifest one’s religion or 
belief may be restricted by the law for the sake of public 
safety, public order, health and moral, and the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others 48. 
 
 
43 ECR, Arrowsmith v. UK, 1977 (application no. 7050/75). 
44 ECR, H v. United Kingdom, 1985 (application no. 11559/85). 
45 ECR, Knudsen v. Norway, 1985 (application no. 11045/84). 
46 CJEU, Y and Z, 2012 (joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11), par. 57. 
47 CJEU, Y and Z, 2012 (joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11). 
48 See art. 9.2 ECHR, recalled in the Explanations on art. 10 of the 
Charter. According to this provision, it has been ruled, for instance, that a 
pharmacist is not allowed to refuse to supply contraceptive on religious 
grounds (ECtHR, Pichon and Sajous v. France, 2001, application no. 
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In this regard, it may be worth recalling that the CJEU 
has recognized to Member States also the faculty to make 
citizenship or residence conditional on migrants satisfying 
integration tests 49: indeed, someone has read such a deci-
sion as possibly legitimating States to refuse citizenship or 
residence permits if the religious beliefs of the applicant 
were to be considered inconsistent with such values as, for 
instance, gender equality 50. Furthermore, although a certain 
degree of active facilitation of religious choices is required 
in the area of employment 51, this has to be balanced with 
other relevant interests and must not imply an intolerable 
burden for the employer 52. 
 
 
49853/99), and that a registrar is not allowed to refuse to carry out same-
sex marriages (ECtHR, Eweida and Others v. UK, 2013, applications nos. 
48420/10 et al.). 
49 CJEU, Parliament v. Council, 2006 (C-540/03). 
50 See, e.g., McCrea in Peers et al. (2014, 302), who recalls, as an 
example, the Decision 286798/2008 of the French Conseil d’Etat (2008), 
which rejected the claim of a woman who had been denied French natio-
nality «Considérant qu’il ressort des pièces du dossier que, si Mme A pos-
sède une bonne maîtrise de la langue française, elle a cependant adopté 
une pratique radicale de sa religion, incompatible avec les valeurs essen-
tielles de la communauté française, et notamment avec le principe d’éga-
lité des sexes; qu’ainsi, elle ne remplit pas la condition d’assimilation po-
sée par l’article 21-4 précité du code civil; que, par conséquent, le gouver-
nement a pu légalement fonder sur ce motif une opposition à l’acquisition 
par mariage de la nationalité française de Mme A». It must be noted, how-
ever, that this decision does not make reference to the case Parliament v. 
Council mentioned above (footnote no. 49). 
51 ECtHR, Eweida and Others v. UK, 2013 (applications nos. 
48420/10 et al.); CJUE Prais v. Council, 1976 (C-130/75). 
52 CJUE, Cadman, 2006 (C-17/05); CJEU, Kiiski, 2007 (C-116/06). 
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Restrictions on manifestation of religion play a central 
role also with specific reference to religious symbols. In this 
field, the case law of the ECtHR shows a significant defer-
ence to the margin of appreciation of the States. For in-
stance, while in Lautsi v. Italy the court ruled in favour of 
the Italian law prescribing the exposition of the crucifix in 
the schools, in several cases it justified restrictions on wear-
ing an Islamic headscarf (hijab) 53. Such restrictions were 
held to be legitimate, for instance, during security con-
trols 54, in schools (in the name or secularism) 55, and in the 
workplace (in the name of the right to conduct a busi-
ness) 56. Furthermore, the prohibition of wearing a full veil 
(niqab or burqa) in the public space has been declared legit-
imate by ECtHR for the sake of the preservation of the con-
ditions of “living together” 57. However, the possibility to 
restrict freedom of religion is not unlimited: for instance, it 
 
 
53 For a reconstruction of different approaches to religion in the juris-
prudence of the ECtHR see Bhuta (2014). 
54 ECtHR, El Morsi v. France, 2008 (application no. 15585/06). 
55 This is so for both teachers (ECtHR, Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001, 
application no. 42393/98; ECtHR, Kurtulmuş v. Turkey, 2006, application 
no. 65500/01) and students (ECtHR, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, 2005, applica-
tion no. 44774/98; ECtHR, Köse and Others v. Turkey, 2018, application 
no. 15014/11; ECtHR, Dogru v. France, 2008, application no. 27058/05; 
ECtHR, Aktas v. France, 2003, application no. 24351/94). 
56 ECtHR, Ebrahimian v. France, 2015 (application no. 64846/11). 
See also, in the same line, CJEU, G4S Secure Solutions, 2017 (C-157/15). 
57 ECtHR, SAS v. France, 2014 (application no. 43835/11), see the 
comment of Parolari (2015); ECtHR, Dakir v. Belgium, 2017 (application 
no. 4619/12); ECtHR, Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, 2017 (applica-
tion no. 37798/13). 
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may not go so far as to justify the exclusion of a Muslim 
woman from the courtroom for wearing a hijab 58. 
Finally, it must be underlined that freedom of religion 
may interact with other rights enshrined in the Charter, such 
as, in particular, freedom of expression (art. 11), freedom of 
assembly and association (art. 12), and the right to educa-
tion (art. 14). In some respects, all of these rights may be 
seen as functional to a full enjoyment of the freedom of re-
ligion. Firstly, as regards freedom of expression, it has been 
clarified that freedom of religion includes the right to prose-
lytising 59. Secondly, as regards the right to education, art. 
14,3 of the Charter states «The freedom to found education-
al establishments with due respect for democratic principles 
and the right of parents to ensure the education and teaching 
of their children in conformity with their religious, philo-
sophical and pedagogical convictions». Thirdly, as regards 
freedoms of assembly and association, States have a posi-
tive obligation to grant to religious communities the possi-
bility to operate without external interference 60. This im-
plies, for instance, that a State may be held responsible, on 
the one side, for failing to take adequate steps to prevent or 
investigate disruption of collective ceremonies or prayers by 
offensive and violent demonstrators 61, as well as for plan-
ning restrictions making it impossible for small religious 
 
 
58 ECtHR, Lachiri v. Belgium, 2018 (application no. 3413/09). 
59 ECtHR, Kokkinakis v. Grecia, 1993 (application no. 14307/88); EC-
tHR, Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, 1999 (application no. 24645/94). 
60 ECtHR, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 2000 (application no. 
30985/96). 
61 ECtHR, Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, 2015 (application no. 30587/13). 
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community to have a place of worship 62. On the other side, 
a State may be held responsible for refusing to register a re-
ligious association for the lack of precise description of its 
beliefs and rites in its statute 63. 
In particular, respect for the autonomy of religious or-
ganizations is taken in great consideration. In this perspec-
tive, art. 17,1 TFEU significantly states that «The Union re-
spects and does not prejudice the status under national law 
of churches and religious associations or communities in the 
Member States». This may also imply, within certain limits, 
the possibility for religious organisations to treat people dif-
ferently in the name of religious freedom 64, not only with 
regard to religious offices (e.g. all-male nature of priesthood 
in the Roman Catholic Church) but also in the field of signifi-
cant secular functions, such as schools and hospitals (McCrea 
in Peers et al. 2014, 296) 65. 
 
 
62 ECtHR, Association for Solidarity with Jehovah’s Witnesses and 
Others v. Turkey, 2016 (joined applications nos. 36915/10 and 8606/13). 
63 ECtHR, Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017 (application no. 
58088/08). 
64 See art. 4,2 of Directive 78/2000/CE establishing a general frame-
work for equal treatment in employment and occupation. 
65 For instance, with regard to the dismissal of church employees for 
adultery, the ECtHR has established that it may or may not violate the 
right to private and family life, depending on the post the employee was 
appointed to. In particular, in the case of a director for Europe of the pub-
lic relations within the Mormon Church, the ECtHR ruled that his dismis-
sal had amounted to a necessary measure aimed at preserving the Church’s 
credibility (ECtHR, Obst v. Germany, 2010, application no. 425/03). On 
the contrary, in the case of an organist and choirmaster in a Catholic par-
ish, it found that the dismissal was illegitimate (ECtHR, Schuth v. Germany, 
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However, the rights enshrined in articles 11, 12 and 14,3 
are not absolute, neither per se nor in conjunction with art. 
10. Therefore, for instance, the dissolution, by the Constitu-
tional Court, of a political party that had expressed the in-
tention of introducing a theocracy based on Islamic law 
(sharia) may be considered compatible with the aim of pre-
serving a democratic society 66. Moreover, freedom of ex-
pression may sometimes be in conflict with (rather than 
functional to) freedom of religion, as religious satire and 
hate speech cases demonstrates. In particular, freedom of 
religion has sometimes been used as a justification for re-
stricting the freedom of expression 67. 
 
 
2010, application no. 1620/03). Furthermore, the ECtHR has established that 
the refusal to appoint a teaching post in a denominational university because 
of alleged heterodox views of the applicant amount to a violation of her/his 
freedom of expression (ECtHR, Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy, 2009, applica-
tion no. 39128/05). 
66 ECtHR, Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, 2003 (applications nos. 
41340/98 et al.). 
67 See, e.g, ECtHR, Otto-Preminger-Institute v. Austria, 1994 (application 
no. 13470/87); ECtHR, Wingrave v. UK, 2005 (application no. 40029/02); 
ECtHR, IA v. Turkey, 2005 (application no. 42571/98); ECtHR, E.S. v. Aus-




The definition of equality as a normative principle – as 
distinguished from a descriptive concept of equality – has 
always been philosophically, politically, and legally trou-
bling. It may be understood, for instance, as: basic or fun-
damental equality entitling every person to equal considera-
tion; equality of status, rights and duties; equality of treat-
ment (in adjudication and/or in legislation); equality of op-
portunities; or equality of achievements 1. The Charter 
avoids to define equality, while different concepts of it are 
endorsed in different parts of the document. 
As already noticed (par. 1.2 above), in the preamble the 
Charter seems to refer to the idea of basic or fundamental 
equality. In turn, Title III articulates the value of equality at 
three levels. Firstly, art. 20 expresses a very general (and 
indeterminate) principle of equality before the law. Second-
ly, articles 21 and 22 provide a specification of such princi-
ple in two respects. In particular, art. 21 lists the main 
grounds on which people must not be discriminated against. 
Art. 22 establishes an explicit link between the principle of 
 
 
1 Although we are aware that the opposition between formal and sub-
stantive equality is very common (if not even dominant) in the philosophi-
cal and legal literature, we prefer not to use it, since it has several ambi-
guities which could not be properly discussed here. On different concepts 
and conceptions of equality see Pojman and Westmoreland (1997). For a 
classical analysis of the different meanings of equality in moral and legal 
discourses see Westen (1990). 
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equality and the commitment of the EU to respect for cul-
tural, religious and linguistic diversity. It must be noted, 
however, that opinions diverge about the scope of art. 22. In 
particular, it is controversial whether it has to be understood 
as only prescribing a duty of the Union to respect differ-
ences between Member States, or as extending also to the 
protection of (persons belonging to) ethnic and cultural mi-
norities within them 2. Thirdly, the principle of equality is 
specifically reaffirmed as equality between women and men 
(art. 23) 3 and with regard to children (art. 24), older persons 
(art. 25), and persons with disabilities (art. 26). It is worth 
noting that, despite the neutral formulation of art. 23, it is 
more likely that the principle of gender equality is applied to 
protect women, since, as a matter of fact, they are the most 
affected by gender-based discrimination. Articles 23-26 may 
therefore be seen as aimed at stressing the principle of 
equality in relation to specific categories of subjects that, for 
different reasons, may be considered particularly vulnerable. 
 
 
2 For instance, Alì in Mastroianni et al. (2017, 438-442) has a propen-
sity for the first interpretation, and suggests that the protection of ethnic 
and cultural minorities may be seen as relying mainly on articles 20 and 
21 of the Charter. By contrast, the latter view is defended by Craufurd 
Smith in Peers et al. (2014). In this regard, it is worth noting that the pro-
tection of ethnic and cultural minorities is explicitly recognized as a duty 
of the States by the ECtHR, Chapman v. UK, 2001 (application no. 
27238/95), par. 93. 
3 The principle of equal treatment between women and men has a 
longstanding history within EU law. Indeed, it was already stated in the 
first founding treaty, signed in Rome in 1957, and sex was the sole pro-
tected ground before the Amsterdam Treaty (see Kilpatrick in Peers et al. 
2014, 583). 
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In this regard, the Charter is perfectly in line with the pro-
cess of specification of the fundamental rights holders 
(Bobbio 1992) that has characterised also international hu-
man rights law in the last decades 4. 
As regards the concepts of equality assumed in Title III, 
articles 20 and 21 refer mainly to the idea of equal treat-
ment (par. 5.1), while articles 23-26 open to the idea of 
equality of opportunities (par. 5.2). These two concepts of 
equality are not necessarily in conflict with each other. On 
the contrary, it may be argued that there is a strong link be-
tween them, insofar as treating all persons “as equals”, ra-
ther than “equally” (see Dworkin 1977, chap. 12, for this 
distinction 5), may be understood as requiring to grant them 
 
 
4 In particular, discrimination against women has been object of sever-
al international declarations and conventions, such as the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
Art. 24 is inspired by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC). Art. 25 finds an antecedent in the UN Principles for Older Persons 
(while a UN convention is still missing in this field). Finally, art. 26 antic-
ipates the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD), which dates 2006. About this, it is worth noting that the CRPD 
has been approved by the Council Decision 2010/48/EC and, therefore, it 
is now an integral part of EU law (see CJEU, HK Denmark, 2013, joined 
cases C-335/11 and C-337/11). 
5 The matter of what “treating people as equals” requires has been 
widely discussed by philosophers. For instance, according to Jeremy Ben-
tham (1789) and the Utilitarians it means weighting equally the welfare of 
every person (which requires taking into account differences in their utility 
functions). By contrast, according to Ronald Dworkin (1977, chap. 12) it 
means treating people with equal concern and respect, that is, giving the 
same importance to the life of different persons, and respecting their au-
tonomy. 
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equal opportunities, which could legitimate differential 
treatment when inequalities in the conditions of persons are 
such that it is not possible to equalize their opportunities by 
treating them in the same way. 
5.1. Equal treatment and non-discrimination 
Art. 20 states: «Everyone is equal before the law». The 
Explanations only say that equality «corresponds to a gen-
eral principle of law which is included in all European con-
stitutions and has also been recognised by the Court of Jus-
tice as a basic principle of the Community» 6. However, it is 
undisputed that, in the EU Treaties 7 and secondary law 8, 
equality is mainly understood as a principle of equal treat-
ment and non-discrimination. In particular, as the CJEU has 
clearly stated, «The principle of equality and non-discrimi-
 
 
6 The Explanations also refer to the following judgements: CJEU, 
Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1984 (C-283/83); CJEU, EARL de Kerlast v 
Unicopa and Coopérative du Trieux, 1997 (C-15/95), and CJEU, Karlsson 
and Others, 2000, (C-292/97). 
7 For a detailed account of the articles of the Treaties on which each of 
the articles of this Title of the Charter is based, see the Explanations. 
8 In particular, several directives are devoted to this issue, such as, in 
particular: the Directive 2000/43/EC against discrimination on grounds of 
race and ethnic origin; the Directive 2000/78/EC against discrimination at 
work on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation; 
the Directive 2004/113/EC on equal treatment for men and women in the 
access to and supply of goods and services; and the Directive 2006/54/EC 
on equal treatment for men and women in matters of employment and oc-
cupation. 
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nation requires that comparable situations must not be treat-
ed differently and that different situations must not be treat-
ed in the same way unless such treatment is objectively jus-
tified» 9. The scope and the field of application of art. 20 is 
very wide. Indeed, as reflected in the case law of the CJEU, 
it applies to everyone 10 and in relation to whatever issue 
falling within the scope of EU law, even though the catego-
ries concerned may be «transient in nature with no wider 
social meaning» (Bell in Peers et al. 2014, 565) 11. 
In this perspective, the principle of non-discrimination 
stated in art. 21 is a specification of the general principle of 
equal treatment, since it details the main grounds on which 
people must not be discriminated against. Accordingly, the 
CJEU has clarified that also the non-discrimination provi-
sions contained in EU directives are «simply a specific ex-
pression of […] the general principle of equality» 12. The 
relevance of explicitly mentioning the grounds of discrimi-
nation listed in art. 21 consists in making any categorisation 
based on them automatically “suspect”. Indeed, such grounds 
 
 
9 CJEU, Advocaten voor de Wereld, 2007 (Case C-303/05), par. 56. 
10 However, on the limits of the personal scope of the Charter (which 
suggest a careful reconsideration of the meaning of “everyone” in art. 20), 
see par. 1.2 above. See also the observations on art. 21,2 below. 
11 For instance, art. 20 played a role in cases that range from differ-
ences in the treatment of parents of twin children as compared to the 
treatment of parents of two children born in different times (CJEU, Chatzi, 
2010, C-149/10), to differences in the procedures applicable to different 
types of farmers with regard to awarding public funding (CJEU, Nagy, 
2011, C-21/10). 
12 CJEU, Lotti and Matteucci, 2010 (joined cases C-395/08, C-396/08), 
par. 58. 
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coincide with those personal characteristics that, more often 
than others, give rise to discrimination. However, this list is 
open and non-exhaustive, as clearly indicates the phrase 
“such as”, which introduces it. Moreover, it must be stressed 
that this is currently the widest list among all the non-
discrimination provisions contained in other international 
instruments, since it includes, together with more traditional 
grounds of discrimination – such as sex, race, colour, lan-
guage, religion, political opinion, national minorities, prop-
erty – also genetic features, disability, age, and sexual orien-
tation. 
The CJEU has established that art. 21 has direct hori-
zontal effects. This means that it may be relied upon by 
individuals in disputes between them, and that national 
judges have the duty to set aside any provision of national 
legislation contrary to the general principle of non-
discrimination as provided for in art. 21 13. Also, it is worth 
noting that the principle of non-discrimination in EU law 
explicitly includes a prohibition of indirect discrimination. 
Therefore, the principle of equal treatment not only pro-
hibits to treat a person less favourably than another in a 
comparable situation, but also prevents the adoption of any 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice that 
would have as a consequence to put persons belonging to a 
specific protected group at a particular disadvantage as 
compared with other persons (unless that provision, crite-
rion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, 
 
 
13 See, in particular, CJEU, Egemberger, 2018 (C-414/16). On the de-
velopments of the CJEU attitude towards the issue of the possible horizon-
tal direct effects of the Charter, see Rossi (2019). 
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and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary) 14. 
It must be noted that art. 21,2 confers a special position 
to nationality, as a ground of discrimination. This reflects 
the fact that equal treatment between nationals of different 
Member States has been recognised a founding importance 
since the very beginning of the process of European integra-
tion. While this provision is silent on the specific issue of 
third-country nationals, a restrictive interpretation has pre-
vailed in the CJEU case law, according to which they fall 
outside its scope 15. In this perspective, although the court 
has ruled that a national provision discriminating against EU 
citizens and third-country nationals in the availability of 
housing benefits is incompatible with EU law, it meaning-
 
 
14 See, for instance, art. 2 of the Directive 78/2000/CE and the analo-
gous articles contained in the other directives mentioned above (footnote 
no. 8). 
15 See CJEU, Vatsouras and Koupatantze, 2009 (joined cases C-22/08 
and C-23/08). This case was actually about the interpretation of art 18 
TFEU. However, as the Explanations clarify, «Paragraph 2 [of art. 21 of 
the Charter] corresponds to the first paragraph of art. 18 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union and must be applied in compliance 
with that article». Such a restrictive interpretation of art. 21,2 has been chal-
lenged, arguing that the ECtHR case law considers different treatments based 
exclusively on nationality as incompatible with the ECHR (see ECtHR, 
Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996, application no. 17371/90; Luczak v. Poland, 
2007, application no. 77782/01, and ECtHR, Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, 2011, 
application no. 5335/05). However, also the ECtHR seems to accept dif-
ferent treatment between EU citizens and third-country nationals in areas 
falling outside EU law (see ECtHR, Moustaquim v. Belgium, 1991, appli-
cation no. 12313/86), and ECtHR, Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, 2011, appli-
cation no. 5335/05). 
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fully based its decision on the Directive 2003/109/EC on 
Long-Term Residents, and not on art. 21,2 of the Charter 16.  
The leanings to exclude the applicability of art. 21,2 to 
third-country nationals is in line with the absence, in Title 
III, of any specific provision on migrants and refugees, de-
spite the fact that, like the other categories considered in ar-
ticles 23-26, they could be regarded as vulnerable subjects 
in many respects 17. This might actually be seen as one of 
the most significant indications of the actual limits of the 
personal scope of the Charter. However, it is worth stressing 
that, since art. 21,2 does not textually limit itself to EU citi-
zens, it remains open to different interpretations (see Kilpat-
rick in Peers et al. 2014, 582, 588-590). 
From a different perspective, the account of equal treat-
ment endorsed in articles 20 and 21 has been criticized for 
the way in which it can be used to legitimate social and le-
gal practices that reproduce disadvantage (Bell in Peers et 
al. 2014, 571). Indeed, since articles 20 and 21 do not – and 
reasonably could not – provide any universal and objective 
yardstick to establish “what is comparable”, the outcome of 
a judgement finally depends on the relevant criteria that the 
court discretionarily selects, on a case by case basis. And, 
indeed, the CJEU actually seems to adopt wavering approaches 
to the principle of equal treatment: it alternates a «light 
touch judicial scrutiny», which, far from being demanding, 
simply requires an “objective” reason for different treatment 
 
 
16 CJEU, Kamberaj, 2012, (C-571/10). 
17 Asylum seekers are considered a vulnerable group, for instance, in 
the case law of the ECtHR. See Peroni and Timmer (2013). 
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(equality as rationality), with a more rigorous and penetrat-
ing approach which requires more than «a simple assess-
ment of whether the distinction [on which a differential 
treatment is based] conforms to a basic sense of rationality» 
(Bell in Peers et al. 2014, 571-575). 
Furthermore, the wider is the margin of appreciation in 
establishing what is comparable, the wider is the risk that 
the prohibition of indirect discrimination may be frustrated 
by an unsensitive and unthoughtful construction of the crite-
ria of comparison, as well as by the inability to detect inter-
sectional discriminations 18.  
For instance, as regards criteria of comparison in relation 
to equality between men and women, the Court has affirmed 
that parental leave is not comparable to military service 
when calculating length of service with regard to payment 
on the termination of employment, since the former is vol-
untary, while the latter is mandatory 19. Similarly, the CJEU 
has ruled that EU law does not preclude national legislation 
that states criteria for the calculation of a contributory inva-
lidity pension which disadvantage part-time workers, de-
spite the fact that the group of part-time workers is, for the 
great majority, made up of female workers 20. However, these 
judgements miss the point that while women are more likely 
 
 
18 The idea of a «discriminatory combination of several factors» may 
be found in the opinion of Advocate General Kokott in the CJEU case 
Parris, 2016 (C-443/15). On the concept of intersectional discrimination 
see Crenshaw (1989). On the twofold dimension of discrimination on mi-
grant’s woman see also Facchi (1998). 
19 CJEU, Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, 2004 (C-220/02). 
20 CJEU, Cachaldora Fernández, 2015 (C-527/13). 
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than men to apply for parental leave and part-time jobs, in 
many cases this is very far from being a voluntary choice.  
Finally, a recent example of unrecognized intersectional 
discrimination may be found, for instance, in the case G4S 
Secure Solutions, 2017 (C-157/15), where the CJEU has 
failed to catch that those employees who are both women 
and Muslim may be disproportionally affected by a formally 
neutral provision prohibiting «the visible wearing of any po-
litical, philosophical or religious sign» in the workplace 21. 
In this regard, it is also worth recalling the COE Resolution 
no. 1478/2006 on Integration of Immigrant Women in Eu-
rope (par. 1), which «denounces the two-fold discrimination 
to which [immigrant women] are subjected on the grounds 
of their gender and their origin and deplores the fact that 
this discrimination operates both in the host society and 
within immigrant communities themselves». 
5.2. Equality of opportunities 
These possible shortcomings in applying the principle of 
equal treatment might and should be partly compensated 
and corrected by the principle of equality of opportunities, 
which, as anticipated above, is also endorsed in the Charter 
(and in the EU anti-discrimination law and policies in gen-
eral; see Kilpatrick in Peers et al. 2014, 592). This principle 
may be understood as requiring that every person is granted 
a set of opportunities that are instrumental to other opportu-
 
 
21 On the restrictions on the right to wear religious symbols see par. 
4.3 above. 
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nities, as well as the necessary conditions for a minimally 
decent life (see Riva 2011 and 2015). 
In particular, the idea of “instrumental opportunities” in-
cludes the possibility to compete, in a fair competition, for 
the access to different social positions, which implies not 
only that those positions are formally open, but also: a) that 
all the structural, cultural and social obstacles that impose 
unfair burdens to some competitors are actively removed; 
and b) that competitors can have access to those goods 
which are necessary for gaining an effective chance to win 
the competition (cf. Rawls 1971; Dworkin 2000; Mason 
2006). Equality in the conditions for a minimally decent life 
requires, instead, the possibility to access to those means 
that are necessary to fulfil one’s basic needs. 
Both of these understandings of the equality of oppor-
tunity are present in the Charter. 
On the one side, the idea of “instrumental opportunities” 
seems to be the rationale of articles 23 and 26, which explic-
itly endorse the idea of “positive discrimination”. In particu-
lar, art. 23,2 states that «the principle of equality shall not 
prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing 
for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented 
sex» 22 (emphasis added). Similarly, art. 26 establishes that 
«the Union recognises and respects the right of persons with 
disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure 
 
 
22 Among the main decisions in which, before the Charter, the CJUE 
admitted – and fixed some limits to – the legitimacy of positive actions in 
the context of gender equality, see, e.g., CJEU, Kalanke v. Freie Hans-
estadt Bremen, 1995 (C-450/93); CJEU, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 1997 (C-409/95); CJEU, Badeck and Others, 2000 (C-158/97). 
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their independence, social and occupational integration and 
participation in the life of the community» (emphasis add-
ed); measures such as, for instance, “reasonable accommo-
dations” in the workplace as foreseen in art. 5 of Directive 
2000/78/EC 23. 
On the other side, equality of opportunity for a minimal-
ly decent life seems to inform articles 24 and 25 (as well as 
part of Title IV on Solidarity, see par. 6.2 below). Indeed, 
art. 24 states that «the children shall have the right to such 
protection and care as necessary for their well-being» (em-
phasis added), thus imposing, among other things, a positive 
obligation to provide services, which is a typical feature of 
social rights. In turn, art. 25 gives specific relevance to «the 
rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity and independ-
ence and to participate in social and cultural life». In this 
respect, the principle of equality may be seen as a bridge be-
tween civil and social rights, as the placement of the Title 
on Equality – exactly in the middle between the Title on 




23 See also CJEU, Coleman, 2008 (C-303/06), and CJEU, HK Den-
mark, 2013 (joined cases C-335/11 and C-337/11). 
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6. Solidarity 
The history of the idea of solidarity as a major political 
value goes back at least to the idea of fraternité, that, to-
gether with those of liberté and egalité, constitutes one of 
the basic principles of the French Revolution. Either under-
stood in opposition to liberal individualism or, quite often, 
as complementary to it (as a sort of counterbalance to re-
dress its potentially atomizing and disaggregating tenden-
cy), this idea has been developed during the XIX century, 
along different lines, within different political traditions and 
social movements (see par. 2.4 above). The conjunction of 
those traditions and movements inspired the social reforms 
that resulted, in the aftermath of World War II, both in the 
distinctive European social model of Welfare State (see Al-
ber 1982; Ferrera 1993; Ritter 1999) and in the idea of so-
cial rights as an essential component of the system of fun-
damental rights. 
Following Marshall (1950), social rights are usually dis-
tinguished from civil and political rights. However, the very 
notion of social rights is somehow controversial (see Pino 
2017, chap. 6). For instance, someone identifies their core 
characteristic in the connection with the fact of belonging to a 
specific social group (e.g., paradigmatically, workers) or so-
cial entity (e.g., the family). Here, the space for solidarity 
might be identified in the fact of sharing common interests 
and goals, the achievement of which requires a certain degree 
of cooperation. By contrast, others look more at the content of 
social rights, and understand them as “entitlements to bene-
80 
fits”, in connection with the idea of equality in the conditions 
for a minimally decent life (see Fabre 2000 and par. 5.2 
above). In this case, what defines the space for social solidari-
ty is the idea that granting a minimally decent life requires at 
least the opportunity to access to those means which are nec-
essary to fulfil basic needs, thus defining a minimal threshold 
of protection against bad luck (cf. Dworkin 2000). 
While both of these understandings may provide a ra-
tionale for some of the rights included in Title IV of the 
Charter, none of them, if taken alone, is capable to embrace 
the whole set of those heterogeneous rights, which range 
from worker’s rights to environment protection, from family 
to health care, and from the right to social security and so-
cial assistance to costumer protection. Indeed, different (clus-
ters of) rights seem to have different rationales.  
Defining how the value of solidarity is understood in 
the Charter is, therefore, quite challenging. Nonetheless, it 
seems undeniable that there is a connection between some 
of the rights included in Title IV and the idea of Welfare 
State, as it is confirmed by the European social acquis on 
which they rest, including the ESC and the CCFSRW 1. 
Moreover, while a study commissioned by the European 
Parliament in 2016 denounced that the ESC has been 
largely ignored by the recent developments concerning the 
protection of fundamental rights in the EU legal order (De 
Schutter 2016), in 2017 the EU institutions adopted a joint 
(although not legally binding) declaration on the creation 
of a European Pillar of Social Rights, which not only re-
 
 
1 See the Explanations. 
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calls the Charter but also widens the catalogue of rights 
enshrined in Title IV. 
The following paragraphs will focus on two main groups 
of rights: the cluster of worker’s rights, including art. 33 on 
work-life balance (par. 6.1), and the entitlements to benefits 
stated in articles 34 and 35 (par. 6.2).  
Nonetheless, among the other rights enshrined in Title 
IV, also the following ones deserve at least to be mentioned: 
art. 36 on the access to services of general economic interest 
(including, for instance, telecommunications, postal services 
and transport, but also electricity, gas and water supply), 
and art. 37 on environmental protection. Indeed, although 
they do not grant entitlements to benefits in a strict sense, 
these articles seem to share a particular attention to the issue 
of those fundamental goods which are necessary for a de-
cent and healthy life. Therefore, these goods not only must 
be made available to everyone, but also have to be protected 
for the wellbeing of all.  
Art. 37, in particular, is highly interesting, as it seems to 
foster another idea of solidarity, distinguished from those 
embedded in the other articles of Title IV: that is, the idea of 
solidarity between generations. 
6.1. Workers’ rights 
Title IV opens with a set of worker’s rights. There is a 
wide acquis in this field, because EU law have been dealing 
with these rights since the very beginning (although mainly 
in the perspective of the freedom of movement and the con-
stitution of a common European market). Among the arti-
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cles on workers’ rights, some – such as art. 27 on the right 
to information and consultation within the undertaking, and 
art. 28 on the right of collective bargaining and action – 
have a prevalent “procedural” nature. Others – such as art. 
30 on the protection in the event of unjustified dismissal, 
and art. 31 on fair and just working conditions – have a 
more substantive dimension. However, all of them seem to 
share the traditional goal of re-equilibrating power imbal-
ances between employers and workers. In this perspective, it 
is worth noting that the Charter does not recognise the right 
to actually have a job: indeed, art. 15 – which, significantly, 
is not included in Title IV, but rather in Title II – only states 
the right to engage in a freely chosen work. 
According to some commentators, art. 31 is «the most 
fundamental of the labour rights set out in the EU Charter» 
(Bogg in Peers et al. 2014, 845), since it establishes an ex-
plicit connection between working conditions, on the one 
side, and dignity and integrity of the person (as affirmed, 
respectively, in articles 1 and 3 of the Charter), on the other. 
Indeed, it states that «every worker has the right to working 
conditions which respect his or her health, safety and digni-
ty» (par. 1), including a limitation of maximum working 
hours, daily and weekly rest periods, and an annual period 
of paid leave (par. 2). The importance of this article is also 
reinforced by the fact that the provision contained in its par. 
2 has been recognized by the CJEU as producing horizontal 
direct effects 2. 
 
 
2 See CJEU, Bauer, 2018 (joined cases C-569/16 e C-570/16); CJEU, 
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften, 2018 (C-
684/16). According to the CJEU, there are only two other articles in the 
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It is undisputed that the personal scope of art. 31 extends 
to every worker, independently of the type of her/his con-
tract of employment, although it is worth remembering that 
art. 15,3 recognises to third-country nationals only the right 
to working conditions equivalent, and not equal, to those of 
EU citizen workers (see par. 1.2 above). However, art. 31 is 
quite vague in several other respects, since its meaning de-
pends on the definition of the concepts of “dignity” at work, 
“health and safety”, and “working conditions”. 
Some indications may be found in the ESC and in the 
case law of the CJEU 3. For instance, the Explanations refer 
to art. 26 ESC on «the right to dignity at work», which es-
tablishes the duty of the State «to promote awareness, in-
formation and prevention of sexual harassment» and of any 
other «recurrent reprehensible or distinctly negative and of-
fensive actions directed against individual workers». Any 
form of disrespect of the worker’s personhood must there-
fore be regarded as a violation of her/his dignity. Further-
 
 
Charter which have horizontal direct effects: art. 21 (see par. 5.1 above) 
and art. 47 on the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. See Rossi 
(2019). 
3 Furthermore, other relevant sources for the interpretation of art. 31 
are the framework Directive 89/391/EEC on the safety and health of 
workers at work, and the Directive 93/104/EC on working time. However, 
the latter Directive is subject to significant limitations and derogations 
which could weaken the provision of the Charter. It has therefore been 
asked (Bogg in Peers et al. 2014, 863) whether the Charter may be, in-
stead, an instrument for challenging such limitations and derogations, as it 
has already happened, for instance, in the field of equal treatment between 
men and women (see CJEU, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-
Achats ASBL and Others, 2011, C-236/09). 
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more, as regards health and safety, the CJEU has been de-
terminant in defining the general principle that health has to 
be understood «as a state of complete physical, mental and 
social well-being», in accordance with the definition of this 
concept provided by the World Health Organization 4.  
As regards working conditions, the CJEU has embraced 
a broad interpretative approach, establishing that this notion 
extends beyond the conditions set out in the contract of em-
ployment 5, and may also cover conditions governing dis-
missal 6 (see below). The issue of fair working conditions 
has been raised also, for instance, with regard to the duty of 
the employers to provide reasonable accommodations for 
persons with disabilities 7, and in relation to the practice of 
indefinitely renewing fixed-term contracts instead of grant-
ing a permanent employment contract 8. Since there is no 
mention of the right to a fair remuneration in art. 31, it is 
doubtful whether it has to be considered as included in the 
notion of fair and just working conditions 9. However, there 
 
 
4 CJEU, UK v. Council, 1996 (C-84/94), par. 15. 
5 CJEU, Meyers v. Adjudication Officer, 1995 (C-116/94). 
6 CJEU, Burton v. British Railways Board, 1982 (C-19/81). 
7 CJEU, HK Denmark, 2013, joined cases C-335/11 and C-337/11). 
8 The CJEU has ruled that such practice may be illegitimate in Mascolo 
and Others, 2014 (joined cases C-22/13 et al.); Pérez López, 2016 (C-16/15); 
and Martínez Andrés, 2016 (joined cases C-184/15 and C-197/15). 
9 In the case Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins, 
2014 (C‑264/12), the national judge asked, among other things: «Must the 
right to working conditions that respect dignity, laid down in Article 31(1) 
of the [Charter], be interpreted as meaning that employees have the right 
to fair remuneration which ensures that they and their families can enjoy a 
satisfactory standard of living?». However, the CJEU declined to hear and 
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are strong arguments in favour of the positive answer: in-
deed, several international instruments and national consti-
tutions state that a fair remuneration is a necessary condition 
for granting a decent standard of living for workers and their 
families. In this perspective, it is worth noting that art. 6 of 
the document on the European Pillar of Social Rights clear-
ly states that «workers have the right to fair wages that pro-
vide for a decent standard of living» and that «adequate 
minimum wages shall be ensured». 
Art. 31 is also strictly connected with art. 30 on the pro-
tection in the event of unjustified dismissal. Indeed, this 
provision may be understood as protecting workers’ job se-
curity as another necessary precondition of their dignity and 
autonomy. Unjustified dismissal may be defined as dismis-
sal without a valid reason 10. EU law identifies some cases 
of automatically unjustified dismissal 11: for instance, while 
 
 
determine the request for a preliminary ruling due to lack of jurisdiction, 
because there was no «specific evidence to support the view that [the na-
tional legislation under scrutiny] was intended to implement EU law». 
10 Many cases concerning dismissal arose before the CJEU in connec-
tion with transfer of undertakings, insolvency, collective redundancy, dis-
crimination, and reconciliation between family and professional life (all 
issues explicitly regulated by secondary EU law). 
11 See also the Appendix to European Social Charter (Revised), which 
states that «For the purpose of [art. 24 ESC] the following, in particular, 
shall not constitute valid reasons for termination of employment: a) trade 
union membership or participation in union activities outside working 
hours, or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours; b) 
seeking office as, acting or having acted in the capacity of a workers’ rep-
resentative; c) the filing of a complaint or the participation in proceedings 
against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulations or 
recourse to competent administrative authorities; d) race, colour, sex, mar-
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art. 33,2 reinforces the protection of parenthood rights in 
this field (see below), art. 10 of the Directive 92/85/EEC 
qualifies as automatically unjust the dismissal of pregnant 
workers and workers who have recently given birth or who 
are breastfeeding 12. However, what constitutes a valid rea-
son for dismissal is generally established on a case by case 
basis. In this regard, it must be underlined that workers’ 
rights may conflict, and need to be balanced, with the right 
to conduct a business as stated in art. 16 of the Charter. The 
latter, of course, is not unlimited 13, but it is not unlikely to 
prevail either 14. In any case, protection against unjustified 
dismissal implies the availability of effective remedies (art. 
 
 
ital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, 
national extraction or social origin; e) maternity or parental leave; f) tem-
porary absence from work due to illness or injury». 
12 This was first established by the CJEU, two years before the Di-
rective, in the leading case Dekker, 1990 (C-177/88). More recently, the 
CJEU has also clarified that the prohibition of dismissal of a pregnant 
woman includes preparatory activities, such as looking for a substitute 
(CJEU, Paquay, 2007, C-460/06), and that the failure to renew a fixed-
term contract of employment due to the fact that the worker is pregnant 
constitutes a direct gender-based discrimination (CJEU, Jiménez Melgar 
2001, C-438/99). 
13 See, e.g., the already mentioned CJEU, HK Denmark, 2013, joined 
cases C-335/11 and C-337/11). Furthermore, on the issue of discriminato-
ry dismissal on religious ground see, for instance, CJEU, Bougnaoui and 
ADDH, 2017 (C-188/15) and ECtHR, Ivanova v. Bulgaria, 2007 (applica-
tion no. 52435/99). 
14 See, e.g., CJEU, Alemo-Herron and Others, 2013 (C-426/11) on 
transfers of undertakings, CJEU, AGET Iraklis, 2016 (C-201/15) on col-
lective redundancies, and CJEU, G4S Secure Solutions, 2017 (C-157/15) 
on religious neutrality in business policies. 
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47 of the Charter) to challenge the employer’s decision and 
the existence of a valid reason 15. 
In the cluster of workers’ rights, it is also worth mention-
ing art. 32, which prohibits child labour and prescribes a 
special protection of young people at work, including protec-
tion against economic exploitation. This implies that young 
workers must be granted not only working conditions ap-
propriate to their age (and which do not interfere with their 
education), but also equal payment as compared to adult 
workers. The rationale of this article seems to be the aim of 
providing a special protection, in the labour area, to particu-
larly vulnerable subjects.  
Finally, art. 33 on family and professional life deserves 
particular attention. This provision may be seen as a bridge 
between the group of labour rights and those rights which are 
shaped as entitlements to benefits (see par. 6.2 below) 16. In-
deed, on the one side, par. 1 prescribes that family is granted 
(not only legal but also) economic and social protection. Ac-
cording to art. 16 ESC, on which this provision rests 17, this 
protection includes «such means as social and family bene-
 
 
15 This also means that the employer has a duty to communicate to the 
worker the reason of her/his dismissal. See ECtHR, KMC v. Hungary, 
2012 (application no. 19554/11). 
16 As regards entitlements to benefits within the cluster of workers’ 
rights, it may be worth mentioning also art. 29 of the Charter, on the right 
of access to a free placement service. Indeed, granting a free placement 
service implies a duty of the State to supply such service, irrespective of 
whether it does it directly, through a public service, or indirectly, by grant-
ing that this service is supplied by private subjects (See Lotito in Bifulco 
et al. 2001, 219; Ashiagbor in Peers et al. 2014, 800-801). 
17 See the Explanations. 
88 
fits, fiscal arrangements, provision of family housing, bene-
fits for the newly married and other appropriate means». On 
the other side, par. 2 is specifically devoted to reconciliation 
between family and professional life, and states that «every-
one shall have the right to protection from dismissal for a 
reason connected with maternity and the right to paid ma-
ternity leave and to parental leave following the birth or 
adoption of a child». 
Apparently, art. 33,2 considers only children as care re-
cipients, ignoring other dependent family members. Fur-
thermore, focusing on protection against dismissal for ma-
ternity and parental leave, it does not refer to other substan-
tive forms of support. However, the legal sources on which 
art. 33,2 is based may widen its scope and meaning 18. In 
particular, one of these sources is art. 27 ESC on the right of 
workers with family responsibilities to equal opportunities 
and equal treatment. This article establishes, among other 
things, that States have a duty to take appropriate measures 
«to develop or promote services, public or private, in partic-
ular child day-care services and other childcare arrange-
ments». In addition, the notion of «family responsibilities» 
adopted in this provision may be wider than parenthood re-
sponsibility.  
Furthermore, art. 33,2 must be read also in accordance 
with the fact that EU law and policies are increasingly up-
 
 
18 According to the Explanations, art. 33,2 rests not only on the al-
ready mentioned Directive 92/85/EEC on pregnant workers and on art. 8 
ESC on the protection of maternity, but also in on art. 27 ESC on the right 
of workers with family responsibilities to equal opportunities and equal 
treatment. 
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holding – besides the more traditional aims of protecting 
maternity and granting equal treatment of women at work – 
the additional goals of freeing them up to take paid work 
and promoting a more equal allocation of care burdens be-
tween women and man. In this perspective, it is worth noting 
that the European Parliament and the Council have recently 
adopted Directive 2019/1158/EU on work-life balance for 
parents and carers, which repeals the previous Directive 
2010/18/EU on parental leave and sets a number of new or 
higher minimum standards not only for parental leave, but 
also – and notably – for paternity and carers’ leave, as a key 
deliverable of the European Pillar of Social Rights 19.  
Such a new focus on paternity and care responsibility in 
general (not limited to parenthood) could expressly fill the 
denounced gaps in art. 33,2 of the Charter, thus providing 
the basis for further measures to combat those stereotyped 
gender roles that prevent women from achieving an effec-
tive equality of opportunities, not only in the field of em-
ployment, but in the whole spectrum of social life. 
6.2. Entitlements to benefits 
The most typical entitlements to benefits can be found in 
art. 34 on social security and social assistance, and in art. 35 
on health care. These rights extend beyond workers’ rights 
only. However, their real scope is disputed. 
 
 
19 This new directive was defined «a key deliverable of the European Pil-
lar of Social Rights» by the Commission, in a press release, on January 2019. 
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Art. 34 includes, on the one side, the right to social secu-
rity benefits and social services providing protection in cas-
es such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependen-
cy or old age, and loss of employment (par. 1-2) 20, and, on 
the other side, the right to social and housing assistance «so 
as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack suffi-
cient resources» (par. 3, emphasis added). However, the dis-
tinction between social security and social assistance is 
somehow blurred and disputed in concrete terms, and, in the 
case law of the CJEU, there seems to be a tendency to con-
sider as social security also benefits that are claimed to be 
social assistance 21. Moreover, it has been argued that art. 
34,1 does not pose any obligation to establish social services 
where none currently exist (White in Peers et al. 2014, 938). 
This would be suggested both by the fact that it simply 
«recognises and respects the entitlement to social security 
and social assistance benefits and social services», and by 
the lack, in the Explanations, of any reference to art. 14 ESC 
on the right to benefit from social welfare services. 
 
 
20 It is worth noting that EU legislation on social security mainly con-
cerns the coordination (and not the harmonization) of national legislations, 
in order to grant the effectiveness of free movement of workers. See, in 
particular, the Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems and the Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 on freedom of 
movement for workers within the EU. 
21 See, e.g., CJEU, Vatsouras and Koupatantze, 2009 (joined cases C-
22/08 and C-23/08). Indeed, the CJEU has made clear that the classifica-
tion of a benefit under coordination rules rests entirely on the factors relating 
to each benefit, irrespective of national legislations. See CJEU, Gillard, 
1978 (C-9/78). 
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Art. 35 includes the right to access to preventive health 
care and the right to benefit from medical treatment. It is 
remarkable that a real right to health is missing in this arti-
cle, although it states that «a high level of human health pro-
tection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation 
of all the Union’s policies and activities» 22. This is especial-
ly relevant if considered in connection with art. 37 on envi-
ronment protection. Until now, however, only three CJEU’s 
substantive judgements have taken art. 35 into consideration, 
while the only EU regulation which explicitly mentions it is 
the Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 on development coopera-
tion. In this context, the Fundamental Right Agency of the 
European Union (FRA) is devoting particular attention to the 
implementation of the right to health, especially with regard 
to the most vulnerable persons, and has repeatedly called for 
revision of both EU and national legislation 23. 
Social security, social assistance, and health care are the 
rights which more directly recall the idea of equal opportu-
nities for a minimally decent life. Not by chance, art. 34,3 
explicitly connects the right to social and housing assistance 
to the goal of combating social exclusion and poverty. 
However, even these rights are not granted to everyone un-
conditionally, but, rather, in accordance with national laws 
and practices, as well as with EU law when relevant. In this 
perspective, the CJEU has acknowledged that, even in the 
case of benefits which flows from EU citizenship (articles 
18-25 TFEU and Directive 2004/38/EC), Member States 
 
 
22 See also CJEU, Deutsches Weintor, 2012 (C-544/10). 
23 For specific references to the relevant FRA’s documents, see Her-
vey and McHale in Peers et al. (2014). 
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may use a residence test in determining access to social se-
curity and social assistance, provided that the residence re-
quirement is proportionate and objectively justified 24. More-
over, as regards third-country nationals, even the ECtHR has 
found admissible to make an entrance permit conditional 
upon having no recourse to public funds 25.  
Solidarity, if conceived as a universal value to be applied 
among the community of human beings, should not be lim-
ited to EU citizens. In the public debate solidarity is fre-
quently invoked to ground legal and political European pol-
icies toward migrants and refugees. Nevertheless, EU and 
the Member States retain a very wide margin of apprecia-
tion in defining who is entitled to what benefit. In particular, 
while some of the “core benefits” covered by the right to 
social security, social assistance, and health care have been 
recognised, for instance, to refugees and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection 26, victims of human trafficking 27, asy-
lum seekers 28, and long-term residents 29, they are not avail-
able to every migrant as such. 
Indeed, as pointed out by FRA (2014, 181), not only «an 
acknowledged right to enter or remain [in an EU country] is 
 
 
24 CJEU, Collins, 2004 (C-138/02); CJEU, De Cuyper, 2006 (C-
406/04). 
25 ECtHR, Bah v. UK, 2011 (application no. 56328/07). 
26 Directive 2011/95/EU (Qualification Directive). 
27 Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in 
human beings and protecting its victims. 
28 Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions Directive). 
29 Directive 2003/109/EU (Long-Term Residents Directive). See also 
CJEU, Kamberaj, 2012, (C-571/10). 
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normally necessary for accessing the full range of social 
rights», but also, «for most migrants, being permitted to en-
ter or to remain in a State is only the first step in establish-
ing full residence rights», while «accessing employment, 
education, housing, health care, social security, social assis-
tance and other social benefits can be a challenging exer-
cise». In particular, migrants who are in an irregular situa-
tion are especially vulnerable to exclusion from these enti-
tlements 30. 
Nonetheless, at least minimum standards must be grant-
ed to everyone, under any circumstances. For instance, the 
ECtHR has stated that State’s responsibility for the violation 
of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment may 
arise, for instance, if it supplies a wholly inadequate amount 
of financial support 31, if it fails to provide shelter in ex-
treme situations 32, or if it puts an individual’s life at risk 
through acts or omissions that deny the individual health 




30 The implementation of social rights taking into account the cultural 
and religious belonging of the migrants and their descendants is an aspect 
that cannot be treated here, see Facchi (2006). 
31 See, e.g., ECtHR, Larioshina v. Russia, 2002 (application no. 
56869/00) on the amount of old-age pension and social benefits allegedly 
insufficient to maintain an adequate standard of living. 
32 See, e.g., ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 2011 (application 
no. 30696/09). 
33 See ECtHR, Powell and Rayner v. UK, 1990 (application no. 
9310/81). 
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7. Towards a More Inclusive Europe? Final 
Remarks 
The debate on European values and their relation to fun-
damental rights is becoming more and more central in the 
European public space. The recent Proposal for a Regula-
tion of the European Parliament and of the Council estab-
lishing a Rights and Values Programme (2018) is aimed, 
among other things, at reaffirming «The Union’s vocation to 
be a community based on shared values and rights, a shared 
historical and cultural heritage and people’s involvement» 
in the face of «emerging movements which challenge the 
idea of open, inclusive, cohesive and democratic societies 
where civic participation and the enjoyment of rights make 
it possible to build a tolerant way of living together». 
In this work we have carried out an initial analysis of the 
values of dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity – that is, 
of the values on which, according to the preamble of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, the EU is founded. The anal-
ysis has been framed in a short account of the philosophical 
debates on those values and is based on the provisions of the 
Charter itself, as well as on the case law of the CJEU and the 
ECtHR. 
The Charter has its roots in the very idea of fundamental 
rights as the best way to secure and realize such values as 
dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; an idea that was 
born and grew in the European culture, nourished by philo-
sophical theories, social movements and legal documents. In 
particular, we have identified, in the landscape of values 
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emerging from the Charter, the inheritance of four traditions 
in the history of ideas: Christianity, Republicanism, Liberal-
ism, and Socialism. 
Like the other legal documents on fundamental rights, 
the Charter does not provide an explicit definition of the 
basic values it is aimed to promote, which actually corre-
spond to very polysemic and philosophically thick concepts. 
Nonetheless, the rights enshrined in it and the (sometimes 
unconventional) way in which they are distributed in its dif-
ferent Titles offer meaningful indications about the way in 
which it shapes those values. Furthermore, the case law of 
the European courts provides further clues as to how they 
are concretely understood.  
While inspired by a number of international legal decla-
rations and conventions on fundamental rights, as well as by 
the constitutional traditions of the EU Member States, the 
Charter has also elements of significant originality. 
Title I articulates the value of human dignity at two dif-
ferent levels. On the one side, it establishes human dignity 
both as a fundamental right itself and as «part of the sub-
stance» of all the other rights laid down in the Charter. We 
have suggested that this should be understood as meaning 
that all the rights included in the Charter – with no distinc-
tion between civil, political, and social rights – have, at their 
core, a “dignity-component”, which must be secured even 
when those rights are restricted. Such dignity-component 
must be protected from violations that could occur in the 
territory of Member States. It also entails the duty of those 
States not to send back third-country nationals to their coun-
tries of origin if such countries are not safe ones and are not 
able to protect individuals from violations of their rights, 
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even if committed by private subjects. At the same time, Ti-
tle I states a specific set of especially dignity-related rights 1, 
thus conferring them a special value and place in the system 
of fundamental rights. We identified the unifying feature of 
such especially dignity-related rights in the fact that they 
express the Kantian idea that no human being can ever be 
treated only as a means for the satisfaction of someone 
else’s ends, or reduced to a “thing”. 
In Title II, the Charter shapes freedom as a political goal, 
which has to be reached through the guarantee of fundamen-
tal rights, and which is complementary (rather than antithet-
ical) to security. Such a relation between freedom and secu-
rity is affirmed since the preamble of the Charter (par. 2), 
where the EU is presented as aiming at «creating an area of 
freedom, security and justice». There are relevant indica-
tions that have led us to conclude that the Charter embraces 
a substantive idea of freedom (understood as an effective 
possibility to exercise one’s freedom), which may require 
the positive intervention of public authorities. Indeed, Title 
II includes rights that are not freedoms in a strict sense, but 
that may be conceived as necessary conditions for the effec-
tive enjoyment of those freedoms. This is the case, in par-
ticular, of the right to education (art. 14), the right to asylum 
(art. 18), and the right to protection in case of removal, ex-
pulsion or extradition (art. 19). 
As regards equality, the Charter endorses different con-
 
 
1 Those rights include: the right to life; the right to the physical and 
mental integrity of the person; the right not to be tortured or subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and the right not to be 
reduced into slavery or forced to work.  
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cepts of it. While in the preamble it seems to assume the 
idea of basic or fundamental equality as a normative prin-
ciple entitling every person to equal consideration, Title III 
significantly institutes a complementary relation between 
the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination, 
on the one side, and the principle of equal opportunities, 
on the other. In particular, the Charter recognises the legit-
imacy and importance of differential treatment (and even 
of positive actions) when inequalities in the conditions of 
persons are such that it is not possible to equalize their op-
portunities by treating them in the same way. It is also sig-
nificant that the Title on Equality includes a norm pre-
scribing respect for cultural, religious and linguistic diver-
sity (art. 22). 
Finally, Title VI includes a set of heterogeneous rights, 
the different rationale of which corresponds, in our reading, 
to different understandings of the value of solidarity. In par-
ticular, while the cluster of workers’ rights seems to share 
the traditional goal of re-equilibrating power imbalances 
within the labour market, other rights (prominently, the right 
to social security and social assistance, and the right to 
health care) are shaped as entitlements to benefits. These 
latter rights rest on the idea of equal opportunities for a min-
imally decent life as requiring at least the possibility of ac-
cessing those means that are necessary to fulfil basic needs. 
Therefore, there seems to be an undeniable connection be-
tween some of the rights included in Title IV on solidarity 
and the idea of a European model of Welfare State (as con-
firmed by the recently adopted declaration on the creation of 
a European Pillar of Social Rights). However, the Charter 
opens at least to another idea of solidarity, that is, solidarity 
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between generations, as art. 37 on the protection of envi-
ronment demonstrates.  
As it has been shown, all the four Titles can, and should, 
be interpreted adopting a gender perspective, considering 
how the single provision can differently affect women and 
men and valorising a conception of gender equality that is 
not limited to the principle of non-discrimination. As a mat-
ter of fact, women’s rights and gender equality have re-
ceived specific attention by the European institutions, an at-
tention which has affected also EU legislation and policies 
concerning migrants and refugees.  
Since its adoption (and even before its entry into force 2), 
the Charter has been attracting increasing judicial attention, 
substantially influencing national judges and, to a certain 
extent, also the ECtHR 3. Since the Charter became a bind-
ing instrument, in 2009, the number of cases in which its 
provisions were cited or argued before the CJEU have been 
increasing significantly (De Búrca 2013). However, its po-
tential role in promoting an increased protection of funda-
mental rights is continuously in struggle with the limits of 
its field of application and personal scope. 
Despite the “spillover effects” of the EU legislation on 
matters of fundamental rights, the principle of subsidiarity 
and the limited nature of the competences of the EU are 
clearly reaffirmed in art. 51 of the Charter, as well as in its 
 
 
2 See CJEU, Parliament v. Council, 2006 (C-540/03) and CJEU, Per-
gan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse v. Commission, 2007 (T-474/04). 
3 The most remarkable example of such influence may probably be 
found in ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010 (application no. 
30141/04). 
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several provisions which state that the rights enshrined in 
them are recognized in accordance with the national laws on 
the subject and/or with EU law, when relevant. There is 
therefore a great concern to prevent EU law undue interfer-
ence with the sovereignty of Member States, which may 
weaken the Charter’s potential. 
Even more relevant are the limits of the personal scope 
of the Charter, that is, the fact that it is still grounded, in 
many respects, on the ambivalent function of citizenship as 
a both inclusive and exclusionary political and legal institu-
tion. Therefore, the Charter actually reproduces the mecha-
nism of overlapping “circles” of equals in status, rights and 
duties, thus creating, at the same time, relations of equality 
and inequality. And, as emerges in the case law mentioned 
throughout the present work, this especially impinges on the 
migrants’ access to some of the rights enshrined in the Char-
ter. Under this respect, the Charter is more similar to nation-
al constitutions, which include both human rights and citi-
zen’s rights, than to international human rights instruments. 
That is no surprise, insofar as the Charter refers to a specif-
ic, even if supranational, political community. 
In the public debate, references to European values are 
sometimes used to support restrictive migration and refugee 
policies aimed at protecting European cultural traditions. 
However, according to our reconstruction, some elements in 
the Charter seem to point in a different direction. Indeed, 
despite the limits of the field of application and personal 
scope of the Charter, the values and the corresponding rights 
it expresses – with their critical tension – still can represent 
a starting point to imagine a more inclusive Europe, capable 
of meeting its cosmopolitan responsibility. Should this re-
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sponsibility be taken seriously, Europe could then become a 
place in the world where respect for individual rights of eve-
ryone can secure a social space for peacefully cohabitation 
of differences. 
In particular, some of the principles emerged from our 
analysis, that have been affirmed in the Charter and in the 
case law of the European courts, appear particularly signifi-
cant not only for EU citizens but also for migrants and refu-
gees: the dignity-component of every right, which sets a 
limit to every form of oppression of each human being, irre-
spective of her/his national origins; the link that the Charter 
institutes between liberty and security, which contrasts the 
current rhetorical idea that national security can be attained 
only by restricting some of the fundamental freedoms of 
non-citizens (and, sometimes, of citizens too); the substan-
tive conception of freedom as something that cannot be se-
cured only by abstaining from interfering with individual 
conduct and by imposing restrictions on such interference, 
but that also requires a commitment of institutions to pro-
mote the conditions for its effective exercise; an idea of 
equality that conceives it not only as non-discrimination and 
equality of opportunities, but explicitly includes respect for 
differences; a rich conception of solidarity that insists on 
workers’ rights but, at the same time, prospects a European 
welfare system able to secure for everyone (citizens and 
non-citizens) at least the possibility to access to those means 
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